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CHARTING COMPLIANCE UNDER THE AGE
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT
JOHN D. BLACKBURN*
'Theprincipal objection to old age is that there's no future in it."
Anon
Ours is a youth oriented society.' A concommitant result of this
orientation is that employment discrimination based on age is as much
a social tradition in this country as other types of bigotry. 2 Notwith-
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Legal Studies, The Wharton School; Assistant Professor of
Business Law, Ohio State University. Much of this article was written while the author was a
Visiting Assistant Professor of business law at Indiana University during the Summer of 1980.
The author wishes to extend his sincere appreciation to the Indiana University Business Law
Department, and especially its chairman, Professor John D. Donnell, for the research support that
was so generously provided.
1. This emphasis upon youth can readily be gleaned from any cursory examination of popu-
lar advertisements designed to appeal to the sizable youth market. See Colman, Schiele insists
youth market is alive and well, ADVERTISING AGE, August 27, 1973, at 166; Weiss, Creative adver-
tising moves towardthe new society, ADVERTISING AGE, July 2, 1973, at 27. A 1975 survey revealed
that "few people in this country today single out the later years as the most desirable period of
one's life. While substantial numbers (69%) considered the teens, 20's and 30's as 'the best years of
a person's life,' only 2% of the public felt that way about the 60's and less than 0.5% about the
70's," L. HARRIS & AssoC., INC., THE MYTH AND REALITY OF AGING IN AMERICA 2 (1975).
2. See generally Butler, Age-Ism." Another Form of Bigotry, 9 THE GERONTOLOGIST 243
(1969); Kovarsky and Kovarsky, Economic, Medical & Legal Aspects of the Age Discrimination
Laws in Employment, 27 VAND. L. REV. 839, 840-48 (1974). But see H. SHEPPARD, NEW PERSPEC-
TIVES ON OLDER WORKERS 12 (1971) [hereinafter cited as SHEPPARD], maintaining that age per se
is not always the determinative factor in personnel decisions, but rather such additional factors as
lower education and diminished skills which generally accompany advanced age.
There is no available data regarding the existence of age discrimination in employment.
However, studies have been conducted on employer and employee attitudes. See generally Ben-
nett & Eckman, Attitudes TowardAging: A Critical Examination of Recent Literature and Implica-
tions for Future Research, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ADULT DEVELOPMENT AND AGING 575 (C.
Eisdorfer and M. Lawton eds. 1973); Havighurst, Social Roles, Work, Leisure and Education, 1d at
598, 601 [hereinafter cited as Havighurst]; Rosen & Jerdee, The Nature ofJob-RelatedAge Stereo-
types, 61 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 180 (1976). One study reveals the extent to which employees in the
aerospace industry feel they have personally experienced or observed age discrimination in em-
ployment. See Kasschau, Perceived Age Discrimination in a Sample ofAerospace Employees, 16
THE GERONTOLOGIST 166 (1976). In the Kasschau study a questionnaire was administered to a
sample of aerospace employees in a large Southern California firm. Half of the employees re-
sponded that they had personally experienced some form of age discrimination, with men and
women and hourly and salary personnel alike reporting such experiences with similar frequency.
The study concludes that age discrimination is widespread in the aerospace industry.
Although there is a scarcity of data regarding the existence of age discrimination in employ-
ment, statistics reflecting the number of individuals discriminated against and the amount of un-
derpayment resulting from unlawful age discrimination disclosed by investigations conducted by
the Department of Labor (DOL) reveal that in 1978, 5,350 persons between ages 40 and 65 were
victims of age discrimination. A total of $14.5 million was found due 4,111 older workers, and
$4.8 million was restored to 1,363 persons, continuing a general annual increase in the amount of
559
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
standing its often flagrant forms, discrimination against older workers
has met with a tacit tolerance by those who decry other more prevalent
discriminatory practices. Unsurprising as this is with today's "now
generation," it is submitted that this problem of the older worker will
gain greater recognition in the future.3 If the present trend of declining
birth rates continues, 4 future generations of younger Americans will be
fewer in number. As the number of America's aged increases, this in-
defensible form of discrimination will not remain untouched.
Federal legislation already exists to combat age discrimination.
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act 5 represents the congres-
discrimination in employment since the DOL began enforcing the federal anti-age discrimination
in employment law. See [1978] U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR ANN. REP. 60-61.
For earlier studies revealing the extent of discrimination against older employees prior to the
enactment of federal civil rights legislation, see generally Hearings on HR. 3651, HR. 3768, and
HR. 4221 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); Hearings on S. 830 and S. 788 Before Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate
Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); Note, Age Discrimination in
Employment- The Problem of the Older Worker, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 383-88 (1966) [hereinaf-
ter cited as 41 N.Y.U. L. REV.].
3. Contra, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 355
(1976) [hereinafter cited as ABSTRACT], projecting a slight decrease in the participation in the
labor market by male workers age 35-64; Beinstock, in AMERICANS IN MIDDLE YEARS (A. Entine
ed. 1974), citing census statistics reflecting a projected increase in the demand for middle-aged
workers in the next two decades. But see ABSTRACT, supra this note, at 355; Havighurst, supra
note 2, at 602, projecting an increase in the percentage of female workers within the 35 to 64 age
group, resulting from contemporary feminist philosophy and declining birth rates.
Employment projections notwithstanding, problems involving middle-aged and older work-
ers should not abate because there is likely to be an increasing amount of job activity involving
older workers resulting from the increasing mobility of middle-aged workers due to changing
attitudes regarding life style roles. See Havighurst, supra note 2, at 616. This phenomenon,
termed by one leading gerontological scholar as "the emerging pattern of second careers," SHEP-
PARD, supra note 2, at 71, presently is sufficiently prevalent to warrant a handbook directed to-
ward helping middle-aged managers make mid-career occupational changes. See generally R.
PEARSE & B. PELZER, SELF-DIRECTED CHANGE FOR THE MID-CAREER MANAGER (1975).
4. Census figures regarding American birth rates reveal a gradual decrease in the number of
births per 1,000 population: from 30.1 in 1910 to 23.7 in 1960, to 14.9 in 1974; and a correspond-
ing decline in the number of deaths per 1,000 population: from 14.7 in 1910 to 9.5 in 1960, to 9.0
in 1975, ABSTRACT, supra note 3, at 51.
5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) [hereinafter cited as the ADEA or the Act].
It appears from the legislative history and the language of the ADEA that it was patterned after
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
See Freed & Dowell, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 6 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
196 (1972). This separate statutory treatment and administrative enforcement reflects congres-
sional concern with the constipated case processing by the overburdened Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission. See 113 CONG. REC. 31254 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Javits). For an
examination of the distinctions between age, race, and sex discrimination, see Note, The Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act of 1967, 90 HARV. L. REV. 380 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Harvard
Note] (suggesting the avoidance of an automatic application of Title VII precedents to the
ADEA's provisions).
For a discussion of earlier state legislative efforts, see 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, supra note 2, at
388-414. For a concise summary of earlier federal legislative and executive efforts, see Note, Age
Discrimination in Employment. Correcting a Constitutionally Infirm Legislative Judgment, 47 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1311, 1324-28 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 47 S. CAL. L. REV.]. For a discussion of
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sional response to ameliorate the condition of the older worker. With
comparable foreign legislation see D. BAUM, THE FINAL PLATEAU: THE BETRAYAL OF OUR
OLDER CITIZENS, ch. 5 (1974) and Boglietti, Discrimination Against Older Workers and the Promo-
tion of Equality of Opportunity, 110 INT'L LAB. REV. 351, 357-60 (1974).
Other sources of federal and state protection against age discrimination in employment exist
as alternatives to the ADEA: Exec. Order No. 11,141, 3 C.F.R. 179 (1964-65 compilation) prohib-
its federal contractors and subcontractors from specifying maximum ages in their employment
solicitations or advertisements, and prohibits age discrimination in the hiring, advancement, dis-
charge, and other terms and privileges of employment. Like the ADEA, Executive Order 11,141
allows exceptions for bona fide occupational qualifications and retirement plans, or where another
statute imposes age restrictions. Unlike the ADEA, the Order is not restricted to any particular
age group. No enforcement mechanism is provided other than requiring each agency and depart-
ment head to take "appropriate action" to make announcements and amend procurement regula-
tions to provide notice of the policy.
The Age Discrimination Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6107 (1976 & Supp. III 1979), pro-
hibits "unreasonable" age discrimination in programs receiving federal financial assistance, in-
cluding revenue sharing funds. Unlike the ADEA, this act is not limited to any particular age
group. Regulations for the act's interpretation and enforcement have been promulgated by the
Secretary of Health and Human Services, and were effective July 1, 1979. See 45 C.F.R. § 90
(1979). The potential far-reaching impact of the act is reduced by 42 U.S.C. § 6103(c)(1), except-
ing employers, employment agencies, labor organizations, and joint apprenticeship programs from
the act-areas covered by the ADEA.
Union members may find it possible to obtain relief from age discrimination in employment
through suit against a union for breach of its duty of fair representation. The Labor-Management
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) [hereinafter referred to as the
LMRA], confers representative status on labor bargaining representatives. Flowing from this
status is the duty to fairly represent all union members. See LMRA § 8(b), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)
(1976); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). A violation of § 8(b) is a union unfair labor practice.
Judicial treatment of § 8(b) allows a statutory bargaining representative a wide range of reasona-
bleness in serving the unit it represents, subject to the exercise of good faith in the exercise of its
discretion. To prove a § 8(b) violation, an employee must show that the union's failure to repre-
sent was based on bad faith. See Gorshak v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 6 Empl. Prac. Dec. 8770 (E.D.
Mich. 1973). Some plaintiffs may find the LMRA more advantageous than the ADEA since it
does not restrict its protections to a particular age class and does not require notice of intent to sue
as a condition to suit.
The fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution may be resorted to
via 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. III 1979) whenever state action denies a person due process or equal
protection of the law because of age. However, the United States Supreme Court restricted the
availability of constitutional relief by refusing to apply strict scrutiny analysis to age discrimina-
tion claims. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) discussed in text
accompanying notes 28-38 infra.
Under § 14 of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 633 (1976) plaintiffs must resort to any available state
remedies as a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit. To date, 38 states, the District of Columbia, and
Puerto Rico have enacted statutes prohibiting age discrimination in at least some types of employ-
ment. See generally ALASKA STAT. § 18:80:200-280 (1974); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-3501 to -3505
(1979); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12900-12996 (West 1980); CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1420-1420.15 (West
1969 & Supp. 1980); COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-116 (1974); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 4-114a, § 31-
122 to -128 (West 1972 & Supp. 1980); D.C. RUL. AND REG. tit. 34, § 201 (1976); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 19, §§ 710-718 (1979 & Supp. 1980); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 23.161-.168, 112.044 (West Supp.
1980); GA. CODE ANN. § 54-1102 (1974); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 378-1 to -38 (1976 & Supp. 1979);
IDAHO CODE §§ 44-1601 to -1606 (1977); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 881-886 (1979); IND. CODE
ANN. §§ 22-9-2-1 to -I1 (Burns 1974 & Supp. 1980); IOWA CODE ANN. § 601A. I-. 19 (West 1975 &
Supp. 1980); Ky. REV. STAT. § 344.010-.990 (1977 & Supp. 1980); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23:892-
:893 (West 1964 & Supp. 1980); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 4571-4574 (1979 & Supp. 1980);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, §§ 14-17 (1979 & Supp. 1980); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151, §§ 1-
10 (West 1971 & Supp. 1980); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 37.2101-.2804 (Supp. 1979); MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 181.81-.812, 363.01-.14 (West 1966 & Supp. 1980); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 49-2-101
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the express purpose of promoting the employment of older workers on
the basis of their ability rather than age, 6 the ADEA prohibits discrimi-
nation against older workers by employers, employment agencies and
labor organizations.7
The Secretary of Labor originally was charged with the Act's en-
forcement and administration.8 As a result of the Carter Administra-
tion's reorganization efforts, jurisdiction over the ADEA has been
shifted to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 9 Under
the Labor Secretary's direction, the Wage and Hour Division of the
to -601 (1979); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-1001 to -1009 (1978 & Supp. 1980); NEV. REV. STAT.
§§ 613.310-.430 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 354-A.1-.14 (1966 & Supp. 1979); N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 10:5-1 to -38 (West 1976 & Supp. 1980); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-1-1 to -14 (1978 & Supp.
1980); N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 290-301 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1972-1980); N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-
01-17 (1979); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4101.17 (Page 1980); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 659.010-.435
(1979); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43,951-,963 (Purdon 1964); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, §§ 131-152 (1964 &
Supp. 1969); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 28-5-1 to -39 (1979 & Supp. 1980); S.C. CODE §§ 1-13-10 to -110
(1976 & Supp. 1980); TEXAS CIV. CODE ANN. tit. I 10A, § 6252-14 (Vernon 1970 & Supp. 1980);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 34-35-1 to -8 (1974 & Supp. 1979); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 49.44.090,
.60.010-.320 (1962 & Supp. 1980); W. VA. CODE § 5-11 -1 to -19 (1979); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 111.31-.37 (West 1974 & Supp. 1980).
6. ADEA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1976) provides: "It is therefore the purpose of this
chapter to promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit
arbitrary age discrimination in employment; to help employers and workers find ways of meeting
problems arising from the impact of age on employment." See also H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1967] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 2213.
The "help" to employers and workers referred to in § 2(b) is provided in the form of studies
undertaken by or for the Department of Labor "concerning the needs and abilities of older work-
ers, and their potentials for continued employment and contribution to the economy .... " and
by fostering the work of state, local, and private agencies in "expanding the opportunities and
potentials of older persons." The Secretary of Labor is required to publish and disseminate the
results of such studies. ADEA § 3(a), 29 U.S.C. § 622(a) (1976).
Interestingly enough, § 2(b)'s statement of purpose has been utilized to support both expan-
sive and narrow applications of the Act. In Moses v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 525 F.2d 92, 93 (8th
Cir. 1975), the court noted that the ADEA is remedial and humanitarian legislation. "It is to be
construed liberally to achieve its purpose of protecting older employees from discrimination." Id
In Goger v. H. K. Porter Co., 492 F.2d 13, 15 (3d Cir. 1974), the Third Circuit allowed a termi-
nated employee to bring suit against her former employer in spite of the employee's failure to
comply with the ADEA's requirement that she initially seek appropriate state relief. The court
emphasized that the common purpose the Act shares with Title VII compelled an interpretation
consistent with the broad remedial construction given to that statute by the courts. Such an ap-
proach is desirable since it recognizes that from such common legislative molds should come
consistency of judicial interpretation. But see Brennan v. Paragon Employment Agency, Inc., 356
F. Supp. 286, 288-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'dmem 489 F.2d 752 (2d Cir. 1974) where the district
court applied a narrow construction of the ADEA's legislative purpose to dismiss an action by the
Secretary of Labor to enjoin the placement of recruitment advertisements restricted to "college
students." Although such advertisements discriminate against older workers, the court main-
tained that the purpose of the ADEA is to protect older workers from the "unreasonable
prejudice," which was held not to be presented by the advertisements.
7. ADEA § 4, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)-(c) (1976).
8. ADEA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 626 (1976).
9. [Hereinafter also referred to as the EEOC]. See Reorg. Plan No. I of 1978, 43 Fed. Reg.
19,807 (1978); Exec. Order No. 12144 of June 22, 1979, 44 Fed. Reg. 37,193 (1979).
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Department of Labor' 0 established interpretative guidelines'' which
are presently in the process of being adopted with modifications by the
EEOC.' 2 However, fourteen years after its enactment, the ADEA is
still for the most part judicially underdeveloped. 13 Earlier cases de-
cided under the Act dealt primarily with its procedural aspects. Only
recently has judicial attention focused significantly on the Act's sub-
stantive provisions. This embryonic legal development increases the
difficulty of employer compliance. Compounding this difficulty are the
1978 amendments' 4 extending the ADEA's protections, which may re-
sult in an increase in age discrimination suits.
The purpose of this article is to investigate the operation of the
ADEA and to explore the areas of uncertainty that presently exist in an
effort to guide the courts in their development of the law. 15 The 1978
amendments are also considered. Where appropriate, typical business
practices are focused upon in an effort to facilitate employer compli-
ance with the Act's principal provisions.
THE ACT'S COVERAGE
The Protected Group
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act applies to employers,
employment agencies and labor organizations, and it prohibits age dis-
crimination in hiring and all other aspects of employment, referral for
employment and membership in unions. 16 Originally, only persons be-
tween the ages of 40 and 65 were protected by the Act. 17 However in
10. [Hereinafter also referred to as DOL].
11. See generally 29 C.F.R. §§ 850.1-860.120 (1979).
12. See Proposed Interpretations: Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 44 Fed. Reg.
68,858 (1979) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1625) [hereinafter referred to as Proposed Interpreta-
tions].
13. The United States Supreme Court has decided only three cases involving the ADEA, two
of which involved procedural issues. See Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750 (1979) (ex-
haustion of state remedies); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978) (availability of jury trial);
United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192 (1977) (legality of mandatory retirement plan).
14. Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendment of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256 § 3(a),
92 Stat. 189 (amending 29 U.S.C. 631 (1976)).
15. The procedural problems involved in the ADEA, except where such procedural aspects
affect the certain substantive rights, will generally not be discussed in this article.
16. ADEA § 4, 29 U.S.C. §§ 623, 630 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). For a discussion of the cover-
age of Title VII, see Benewitz, Coverage Under Title VII ofthe Civil Rights Act, 17 LAB. L.J. 285
(1966) [hereinafter cited as Benewitz].
17. ADEA § 12, 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1976). See Hart v. United Steelworkers, 350 F. Supp. 294
(W.D. Pa. 1972), appeal dismissed, 482 F.2d 282 (3d Cir. 1973) (holding that plaintiffs who were
union members lacked standing to challenge their union's declaration that they were ineligible to
run for union office because they had reached 65 years of age prior to the end of the designated
nominating period which was beyond the age protected by the Act); accord, Bevans v. Nugent, 14
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (holding 37 year old government employee not covered
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1978, Congress raised the upper limit to age 70 for all non-federal em-
ployees covered by the Act. 18
Although it may be unlawful for an employer to discriminate in its
hiring practices by giving a preference to individuals 30 years of age
over those within the 40 to 70 limitation, the same employer would not
by the ADEA); Bishop v. Jelleff Assoc., 398 F. Supp. 579 (D.D.C. 1974); Wage and Hour Opinion
Letter (June 4, 1970) (declaring that a 33 year old worker who was denied training under an
apprenticeship program had no recourse under the Act).
The 40 to 65 age limitation reflected the congressional conclusion that age discrimination was
directed most frequently against workers between those ages. See 113 CONG. REC. 31, 252 (1967)
(remarks of Sen. Yarborough). When originally introduced, the bill's minimum age limit was set
at 45 but was lowered to 40 on the basis that discrimination became evident at that age. See H.R.
Rep. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. reprinted in [1967] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2213, 2219,
113 CONG. REC. 31,252, 31,255 (1967) (remarks of Sens. Yarborough and Javits). Most legislative
debate centered on the lower age limit because of the practice in the airline industry of retiring
stewardesses at age 32. See id. at 2219, 2225-27. The 65 year old maximum age limit seems to
have been a general recognition of that age as the traditional retirement age. 113 CONG. REC.
31,255 (remarks of Sen. Yarborough). Originating with Chancellor Otto von Bismark's social
security law in 1877, at a time when the average life expectancy was 35 years, the limit first ap-
peared in America with the Social Security Act of 1935, which discouraged working beyond age
65 by limiting the amount of income to be earned while collecting social security benefits. See 47
S. CAL. L. REV. supra note 5, at 1334.
Additionally, the original age limits reflected a congressional effort to provide uniformity
between federal and state fair employment legislation, which generally included the 40 to 65 limi-
tation. See [1967] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2213, 2219; Note, Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment- The Problem of the Worker Over Sixty-Five, 5 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 484, 497-98 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as 5 RUT. CAM L.J.]; Note, Mfandatory Retirement.- The Law, The Courts, and the
Broader Social Context, II WILLAMETTE L.J. 398, 405 n.30 (1975) [hereinafter cited as II WIL-
LAMETTE L.J.]. See also Townsend v. County of Los Angeles, 49 Cal. App. 3d 263, 269, 122 Cal.
Rptr. 500, 503 (1975) (noting the complementary nature of state and federal law in upholding the
constitutionality of a county mandatory retirement age of 65 for public employees).
Of those states which have statutes prohibiting age discrimination in employment, 23 do not
restrict their coverage by age limits. Of those that restrict coverage to a particular age group, four
use the 40 to 65 year old bracket. See GA. CODE ANN. § 54-1102 (1974); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 49.44.090 (Supp. 1980); W. VA. CODE 5-11-3 (1979); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.32 (1974). Three
states and Puerto Rico employ a 65 year old upper limit but have established various lower age
limits. See N.Y. ExEc. LAW 296 (3-a) (Supp. 1980) (18 years); OR. REV. STAT. § 659.030 (1979)
(18 years); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, § 151(1) (Supp. 1979) (minimum age depends on industry);
TEX. CiV. CODE ANN. tit. I 10A, § 6252-14 (1970). Idaho protects employees under age 60. See
IDAHO CODE § 44-1602 (1977); Colorado protects workers aged 18 to 60. See COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 8-2-116 (1973). Louisiana protects employees under age 50 unless the employer's pension plan
meets certain requirements. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23, 893 (1964 & Supp. 1980). Five states
protect workers from age 40 to 70. See IND. CODE ANN. § 22-9-2-1 (Supp. 1980); Ky. REV. STAT.
§ 344.040 (Supp. 1980); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1003 (Supp. 1980); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4101.17 (1980); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-6(I) (Supp. 1980).
Another explanation for the acceptance of the age restrictions is § 13 ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 632
(1976), requiring the Secretary of Labor to report to Congress on the advisability of continuing the
age limits, thereby forestalling debate on the issue until a later time. One report from then Secre-
tary Wirtz, submitted in 1968 in the form of a letter to Senator Humphrey and Speaker McCor-
mick, addressed primarily the minimum age restriction and recommended no change in the
ADEA's age limits; it indicated that the problem of compulsory retirement was at that time under
study and would be included in a future report. BUREAU. OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, (19681 LABOR
RELATIONS YEARBOOK 387. This report was not completed. See H.R. REP. No. 527, 95th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 2 (1977).
18. 29 U.S.C. § 631 (Supp. III 1979).
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be prohibited by the Act from refusing to hire applicants between the
ages of 30 and 39 since they are not within the protected age classifica-
tion. ' 9 Similarly, an employer would not be prohibited from indicating
a preference for individuals at least 40 but less than 70 years old since
those excluded do not fall within the protected class.20 However, if an
employer indicates that the preference is to be granted to individuals
between the ages of 40 and 50, it may be violating the Act since under
both the DOL's interpretation and the EEOC's proposed interpreta-
tions it is unlawful to discriminate on the basis of age among people
within the protected group.2'
Controversial when originally enacted, the ADEA's upper and
lower age limits generated much criticism. 22 Most attacks were di-
rected against the policy and constitutional considerations surrounding
the 65-year age limit;23 however, the lower limit also was criticized. 24
The upper age limit was originally selected because it was the custom-
ary retirement age.25 It permitted continuation of mandatory retire-
ment policies for workers reaching age 65. Responding to criticism that
mandatory retirement based solely upon age is arbitrary, and that
chronological age alone is a poor indicator of ability to perform a job,
Congress in 1978 raised the upper limit to age 70 for the private sector,
and removed the ADEA's upper age restrictions entirely for federal
employees. 26 Although the change should satisfy most critics of the
Act's coverage, it represents a compromise between those favoring re-
moval of the upper age limit entirely, and those remaining uncertain of
the consequences of changing the original maximum age.27 The consti-
19. Cf. 29 C.F.R. § 860.91 (1979); Wage and Hour Opinion Letter (March 13, 1970).
20. Cf. Wage and Hour Opinion Letter (August 7, 1968) (indicating this would be the result
even though the Act does not expressly authorize discrimination in favor of the protected group).
21. 29 C.F.R. § 860.91 (1979); Proposed Interpretations, supra note 12, § 1625.2(a). Accord,
Hays v. Republic Steel Corp., 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1640, 1644 (N.D. Ala. 1974), affd in part,
rev'd in part, 531 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1976); 113 CONG. REG. 31,255 (1967) (remarks of Sen.
Javits).
22. See generally, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311, supra note 5; Note, Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 924, 925 (1975).
23. See 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311, supra note 5; see also, Note, Mandatory Retirement-A
Vehiclefor Age Discrimination, 51 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 116, 130, 135, 138-39 (1974); Note, Age
Discrimination Employment, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 924, 945 (1975); 5 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 484, supra note
17, at 502-12; Note, Discrimination Against the Elderly. A Prospectus ofthe Problem, 7 SUFFOLK
U.L. REV. 917, 922 (1973); Note, Constitutional Attacks on Mandatory Retirement: A Reconsidera-
tion, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 549 (1976); 11 WILLAMETTE L.J. 398, supra note 17.
24. See Levien, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Statutory Requirements and Re-
cent Developments, 13 DUQ. L. REV. 227, 229-30 (1974).
25. See note 17 supra.
26. 29 U.S.C. §§ 631, 633a (Supp. III 1979). The upper age limit for federal employees previ-
ously was 70 years of age. See Christie v. Marston, 551 F.2d 1080 (7th Cir. 1977).
27. See H.R. REP. No. 527, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1977).
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tutional validity of any upper age restriction upon the ADEA's cover-
age remains an open question. A 1976 Supreme Court case sheds some
light on the probable judicial posture.
In Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia ,28 appellee, a state
police officer, was involuntarily retired pursuant to state law upon
reaching age 50 although he had passed all physical and mental exami-
nations just four months before. 29 Responding to his challenge of the
statute's constitutionality under the equal protection clause,30 a three-
judge district court held the statute void under a rational basis analy-
sis. 31 The court reasoned that in light of the defendant's failure to jus-
tify the significance of selecting 50 as the retirement age, it was
compelled to conclude the statute lacked a factual basis to support its
constitutionality. 32 On appeal, the Supreme Court in a per curiam
opinion held that the statute did have a rational factual basis.33 Draw-
ing fiom a legislative commission's report which had concluded that
the nature of police work required "comparatively young men of vigor-
ous physique," 34 the Court found a sufficient factual basis to support a
conclusion that mandatory retirement at age 50 served to further the
statutory purpose of protecting the public.
Significantly, the Court expressly denied the status of suspect clas-
sification for police officers over age 50 and, furthermore, refused to
recognize governmental employment as a fundamental right. 35 By re-
fusing to recognize age as a suspect class, or public employment as a
fundamental right, the Court indicated that any challenge to the
ADEA's age restrictions will not come under strict scrutiny analysis but
28. 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
29. Id at 311.
30. The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, an express limitation upon
state action, is not expressly obligatory upon the federal government, since there is no correspond-
ing clause in the fifth amendment. This could serve to undermine the utility of applying the
Court's analysis in Murgia to a determination of the constitutionality of certain provisions in the
ADEA. However, the nomenclature articulated by the Court in equal protection cases has been
utilized to invalidate unconstitutional discrimination in cases decided under the fifth amendment's
due process clause. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). That Murgia is an equal protec-
tion case should not serve to summarily distinguish its appropriateness to constitutional analysis
of the ADEA. For a discussion of this "substantive due process-equal protection" interchangea-
bility, see M. FORKOSCH, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 441-42 (2d ed. 1969); B. SCHWARZ, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW § 9.1 (2d ed. 1979); Singer, Bringing The Constitution to Prison: Substantive Due
Process and the Eighth Amendment, 39 U. CIN. L. REV. 650, 667-71 (1970).
31. Murgia v. Commonwealth of Mass. Bd. of Retirement, 376 F. Supp. 753 (D. Mass. 1974),
rev'd, 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
32. Id at 756.
33. 427 U.S. at 314-17.
34. Id at 314 n.7.
35. Id. at 312-14.
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will be examined under the rational basis standard. 36
Whether the ADEA's age limits will survive judicial scrutiny
under a rational basis analysis depends on a determination that they
serve to further the statutory purposes. This calls for an empirical as-
sessment of the age limits as a rational means of fulfilling the Act's
objectives. 37 When viewed in light of the Act's articulated purpose "to
promote the employment of older workers based on their ability rather
than age,"' 38 even the ADEA's extended upper age limit will fail to pass
constitutional muster if gerontological research should reveal that ster-
eotyped negative attitudes of over-70-year-old workers are unfounded.
However, gerontological research presently is in an embryonic stage of
development, only recently generating intensive investigation. This
should serve to uphold the statute's constitutionality, particularly in
cases involving high risk, public safety occupations such as existed in
Murgia .
36. Different constitutional standards have been employed in deciding the validity of legisla-
tion under the due process and equal protection clauses. Generally, most legislation falls under
the "rational basis" approach, sometimes referred to as "minimum scrutiny." Under this ap-
proach, if a court can imagine any state of facts which justifies the legislative enactment, the
statute will pass constitutional muster. There exists a presumption of the statute's constitutional-
ity, and indeed under this approach most legislation is deemed constitutional. See, e.g., William-
son v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). The Court has applied a more stringent, "strict
scrutiny" standard to statutes which deny certain "fundamental rights" or create "suspect classifi-
cations." Although it is not altogether clear what are the essential characteristics for qualification
as a fundamental right, such rights are not limited to those specifically enumerated in the Consti-
tution. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (finding a fundamental right to
privacy although such right is not specifically enumerated in the Constitution). Suspect classifica-
tions generally have been limited to those which discriminate on the basis of an immutable char-
acteristic of birth against those individuals who have experienced a history of intentional
discrimination. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (race); Oyama v. California, 332
U.S. 633 (1948) (ancestry). See also United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4
(1938). If such a fundamental right is denied or a suspect classification created, a court will pre-
sume the statute to be unconstitutional unless it can be shown that its enactment was pursuant to a
"compelling state interest" and, furthermore, that it is the "least restrictive alternative" for accom-
plishing its goal. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). The current Court, while not
formally acknowledging it, is presently fashioning a third level of equal protection scrutiny which
falls between the extreme approaches of the traditional two-tiered model. Under this current
approach, a statute's constitutionality depends on whether the means or classification is necessary
to further the statute's objective. See Gunther, Forward" In Search of Evolving Doctrines on a
Changing Court- A Modelfor Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Gunther]. For further discussion of the various constitutional doctrines as applied to the
ADEA, see generally, 47 S. CAL. L. REV., supra note 5, at 1336-46. For an excellent discussion of
the constitutional aspects of Massachusetts Bd of Retirement v. Murgia, see Abramson, Compulsory
Retirement, The Constitution and the Murgia Case, 42 Mo. L. REV. 25 (1977).
37. See Gunther, supra note 36, at 20:
The model suggested by the recent developments would view equal protection as a
means-focused, relatively narrow, preferred ground of decision in a broad range of cases.
Stated most simply, it would have the Court take seriously a constitutional requirement
that has never been formally abandoned: that legislative means substantially further
legislative ends.
38. ADEA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1976).
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There is a line of constitutional case law which has evolved under
the equal protection clause which, if applied to any challenge to the
ADEA's age restrictions, should validate their inclusion in the statutory
scheme. Referred to by one constitutional scholar as the "step-at-a-
time" 39 justification, it serves to validate underinclusive legislative clas-
sifications on the following basis:
[Tiraditionally a legislature has been allowed to take reform "one
step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which
seems most acute to the legislative mind," . . and a legislature need
not run the risk of losing an entire remedial scheme simply because it
failed, through inadvertance or otherwise, to cover every evil that
might conceivably have been attacked.40
The rationale for this principle rests on the recognition of the imperfec-
tions of the legislative process which prevent much more than piece-
meal responses to particular problems, and the additional recognition
that even where broader legislative action is feasible, a more cautious
or experimental course may be chosen for legislative intervention.
An analysis of the ADEA reveals that Congress chose such a cau-
tious course when it included the age limits. Section 13 originally re-
quired the Secretary of Labor to submit annual reports on the
advisability of continuing the restrictions.4' As a result of the Carter
Administration reorganization, this is now the responsibility of the
EEOC.42 Furthermore, section 3 provides for the performance of re-
search projects for this purpose.43 Taken together these sections reflect
congressional intent to respond to the needs of those excluded from the
ADEA's coverage only after extensive study has been conducted. The
ADEA's 1978 amendments further support this conclusion. As a result
of the amendments, section 5 now requires a study to be conducted to
examine the effect the amendments have had in raising the upper age
limit to age 70, to determine the feasibility of eliminating the 70 years
limit, and to assess the feasibility of raising the limitation above 70
years of age."4 This study was to be provided to the President and the
Congress as an interim report no later than January 1, 1981, with a
final report due no later than January 1, 1982.45 In its report on the
39. P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS
564 (1975).
40. McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969). See also, Williamson
v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955), and Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106
(1949).
41. See 29 U.S.C. § 632 (1976).
42. Reorg. Plan No. I of 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 19,807 (1978).
43. 29 U.S.C. § 622 (1976).
44. Id § 624 (Supp. III 1979).
45. Id
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amendments, the House Education and Labor Committee indicated
that additional amendments may be considered if future research
reveals that further change is warranted.46
Although the ADEA's recent amendments improve the condition
of many older workers, Congress should again consider the repeal of
any upper age limit. Regardless of the maximum age limit's constitu-
tional status, the forced retirement of a single worker willing and able
to do a job is an injustice. Furthermore, Congress should focus atten-
tion upon the Act's 40 year old lower limit, reducing it to the generally
accepted age of majority, 18 years. Several states already prohibit age
discrimination against persons under age 40.47 History has illustrated
that age is not always commensurate with ability: Jefferson wrote the
Declaration of Independence at age 33; Einstein developed his theory
of relativity when he was 26; Byron, Raphael and Shelly each died at
39. The fact is, many of the world's greatest geniuses never saw 40
years. Congress should therefore further amend the ADEA. Any pur-
ported age discrimination law which leaves untouched an area of arbi-
trary age discrimination perpetrated against society's very young and
very old reflects a callous indifference to those most hurt by discrimina-
tory practices.
Covered Employers
Notwithstanding the limitations on the ADEA's coverage via defi-
nition of the protected group, the Act's coverage extends to all non-
seasonal employers having twenty or more employees and affecting
46. See H.R. Rep. No. 527, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 7 (1977), where the house committee stated:
The committee has considered removing the upper age limit entirely, but has decided
that an increase to age 70 at this time is the best course of action. The age 70 limit is a
compromise between some who favor removing the age limit entirely, and others who
are uncertain of the consequences of changing the present age 65 limit. Experience with
the age 70 limit would give us more data and other facts to better evaluate the pro and
con arguments on eliminating mandatory retirement completely. There is also a prece-
dent for the age 70 limit. This has been the age of mandatory retirement for most civil
service employees for many years, and the committee knows of no managerial or labor
problems as a result of the Federal mandatory retirement age of 70.
The committee expects continuing public and congressional interest in eliminating
mandatory retirement. The committee expects to re-assess, in due course, this newly
established upper age limit, evaluating experience in the private and public sectors with
an eye toward possibly eliminating the upper age limit altogether. To help with this
evaluation, the bill would also require a report from the Secretary of Labor on
mandatory retirement and the feasibility of eliminating the upper age limit in the Act.
The 1967 Act included a requirement for the Secretary of Labor to submit a report on
involuntary retirement but this report has not yet been completed. Therefore, this bill
would establish deadlines in law for this report. An interim report would be due I year
after the effective date, and a final report would be required no later than 2 years after
the effective date.
47. See note 1 supra.
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commerce.48
State Government Employers. Under the 1972 amendments, state
government employers are now included in its coverage. 49 In two cases
decided in 1976,50 the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether
similar amendments extending the coverage of other federal labor le-
gislation to include state employees violates the federalism principle
embodied in the tenth and eleventh amendments to the United States
Constitution.
In National League of Cities v. Usery,51 plaintiffs sought a declara-
tory judgment that the 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards
Act 52 violated the tenth amendment as applied to the states. Signifi-
cantly, the League did not challenge the amendments as an invalid ex-
48. ADEA § l1(b), 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1976) provides:
The term "employer" means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who
has twenty or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar
weeks in the current or preceding calendar year: Provided, that prior to June 30, 1968,
employers having fewer than fifty employees shall not be considered employers. The
term also means (1) any agent of such a person, and (2) a State or political subdivision of
a State and any agency or instrumentality of a State or a political subdivision of a State,
and any interstate agency, but such term does not include the United States, or a corpo-
ration wholly owned by the Government of the United States.
Although § 1 (b) does not make reference to seasonal and nonseasonal employers, the probable
purpose of the 20 employees for 20 weeks requirement is to exclude seasonal employers from
coverage.
An issue not yet confronted by the courts is whether an employer having a fluctuating work
force is covered during those times when his force is below the statutory minimum of 20 employ-
ees. The plain meaning of § 1 I(b) dictates that once such a requirement has been met for the 20-
week period, the employer is covered for the entire year. Otherwise an employer conceivably
could manipulate the number of its employees in order to circumvent the act. The legislative
history to § 701(b) of Title VIl, see note 5 supra, which contains virtually an identical definition of
an employer, indicates that there was some congressional confusion regarding this issue as applied
to that act. See Benewitz, supra note 16, at 287-88.
Most states and Puerto Rico extend coverage to all employers in the state, but Arkansas and
Texas regulate only public employers. See ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-3501 to -3505 (1979); TEX.
CiV. CODE ANN. tit. I 10A, § 6252-14 (1970). While the ADEA requires an employer to have 20 or
more employees, most states do not require a minimum. For those states with minimum employee
requirements, the number needed varies greatly. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-122(0 (West
Supp. 1980) (three); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19 § 710(2) (1979) (four); IOWA CODE ANN. § 601A.6(2)
(West Supp. 1980) (four); COL. LAB. CODE § 1413(d) (West Supp. 1980) (five); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 354-A:3(5) (1966) (six); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.040 (Supp. 1980) (eight); GA.
CODE ANN. § 54-1102 (1974) (ten); W. VA. CODE § 5-11-3(d) (1979) (twelve); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 613.310(1) (1979) (fifteen); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 15(b) (1979) (fifteen); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 48-1002(2) (1978) (twenty-five); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-35-2(5) (Supp. 1979) (twenty-five). One
state exempts private or governmental employers covered by the ADEA. See IND. CODE ANN.
§ 22-9-2-1 (Burns Supp. 1980).
49. ADEA § 11(b) 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1976). Although the recent amendments maintain the
exemption for federal government employers, they must conform to Executive Order 11, 141 which
requires the fair treatment of older workers. See note 5 supra.
50. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
833 (1976).
51. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
52. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1938) [hereinafter referred to as FLSA].
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ercise of congressional powers under the commerce clause, but claimed
Congress went beyond tenth amendment limitations when it sought to
"regulate directly the activities of States as public employers." 53 De-
claring the amendments unconstitutional, the Court focused on the de-
gree to which they displaced state functions deemed "essential to
separate and independent existence. n54 The Court concluded that by
requiring the payment of a minimum wage and overtime pay, the
amendments served to alter traditional governmental employment
practices, forcing the states to restructure their services and opera-
tions. 55 Thus, the Court declared that there are limits to Congress's
power pursuant to the commerce clause, adopting as the measure of
these constitutional limits an "essential function test." Under this test,
if the congressional enactment displaces traditional choices regarding
how states structure their services, the statute violates the tenth amend-
ment.5
6
Applying this test to the ADEA's coverage of state employees, it is
doubtful that the Court would reach the same result as it did in Na-
tional League of Cities. Unlike FLSA's minimum wage and overtime
provisions, the ADEA's requirements should not impose increased
costs resulting in the restructure and possible curtailment of existing
state services. The ADEA is predicated on the belief that commonly
held stereotyped notions of older workers are unfounded; that these
workers can provide the same skills and services possessed by their
younger counterparts without employers incurring any increased costs.
Additionally, the Act provides that where such skills are not possessed
by the older worker, and where additional costs to employee benefit
plans are incurred by hiring older employees, the employer is permitted
to discriminate in favor of younger workers in its hiring practices and
its benefit plans.57 Using a similar analysis, one lower court case re-
cently upheld the ADEA's extended coverage of state employers. 58
Shortly after deciding National League of Cities, the Court indi-
53. 426 U.S. at 841.
54. Id at 845.
55. Id at 846-49. FLSA's overtime provisions, for example, require that premium compen-
sation be paid in cash rather than in compensatory time off. This provision would force many
governmental employers to abandon the day-shift routine commonly utilized for firemen.
56. Id.
57. 29 U.S.C. § 623() (1976 & Supp. III 1979); seealso notes 142-207 infra and accompany-
ing text.
58. See Aaron v. Davis, 424 F. Supp. 1238 (E.D. Ark. 1976), where the court refused to set
aside its earlier decision that a Little Rock mandatory retirement ordinance for firemen violated
the ADEA. The court distinguished National League of Cities by finding that the ADEA does not
"significantly interfere" with the allocation of financial resources by state officials. Id at 1241.
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cated that its ruling may not apply to federal laws prohibiting employ-
ment discrimination. In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,59 the Court upheld
amendments extending Title VII's coverage to state employers. In Fitz-
patrick, retired male employees of Connecticut recovered damages
caused by sex discrimination in the State's retirement policy. In af-
firming the award, the Court found constitutional authorization for Ti-
tle VII's extended coverage in the fourteenth amendment's enabling
clause which authorizes Congress to enforce that amendment by appro-
priate legislation. The Court rejected the argument that Title VII's
amendments violated the eleventh amendment, stating that "the Elev-
enth Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty which it em-
bodies . ..are necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of
.. .the Fourteenth Amendment." 6 Under this approach, the ADEA's
extended coverage also should be upheld, since the ADEA and Title
VII share similar statutory objectives. Applying both National League
of Cities and Fitzpatrick, the Utah and North Dakota district courts
recently upheld the ADEA's amendments. 6'
Branches and Subsidiaries. While the statutory minimum number
of employees required to confer "employer" status on a firm seems suf-
ficiently small enough to include all but the smallest enterprises under
the Act, a question occasionally arises regarding the status of depart-
ments, branches and corporate subsidiaries. It seems clear that all de-
partments and branch offices of a firm will be included in determining
whether it meets the statutory minimum. 62 When a corporation is
charged for the acts of its subsidiary, currently the degree of control
retained by the parent over its subsidiary's practices is the determina-
tive factor in deciding whether an employee of the subsidiary is also the
parent company's employee. 63 This "control test" represents the appli-
cation of common law agency doctrine, and its use is not surprising
insofar as the Act defines an employer as including "any agent of such
a person." 64
59. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
60. Id at 456.
61. See Usery v. Board of Educ., 421 F. Supp. 718 (D. Utah 1976); Remmick v. Barnes
County, 435 F. Supp. 914 (D.N.D. 1977).
62. See Wage and Hour Opinion Letter (July 12, 1968).
63. Woodford v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 369 F. Supp. 911, 916 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Brennan v. Ace
Hardware Corp., 362 F. Supp. 1156, 1158 (D. Neb. 1973), afd, 495 F.2d 368 (8th Cir. 1974).
64. ADEA § 11(b), 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1976). In agency law, control by a principal over the
actions of an agent frequently is the articulated "test" for the existence of an agency relationship.
See W. SEAVEY, THE LAW OF AGENCY § 3E (1964) and cases cited therein.
Title VII's definition of an employer is similar to the ADEA's except that the statutory mini-
mum number of employees is 15, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1976). Both the EEOC and the courts take
the position that if separate establishments are part of an integrated enterprise, they may be
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However, "control" is an all-inclusive term which is vague, mean-
ing so much as to mean nothing. As a "test" it should be discarded. It
is more appropriate to consider the concept of control as a useful tool
rather than an acid test. One court has suggested that the focus be on a
particular type of control: that form of control which a parent com-
pany exercises over its subsidiary's personnel practices. 65 At first blush
treated as a single employer for Title VII coverage. See, e.g., Williams v. New Orleans S.S. Ass'n,
341 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. La. 1972); Local 293, Int'l Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees v. Local
No. 293-A, Int'l Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 526 F.2d 316 (5th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Enterprise Ass'n of Steam Fitters Local 638, 360 F. Supp. 979, 994-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1973),
mod'fiedsub nom Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n of Steam Fitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974).
Some of the criteria applied in determining whether an enterprise is integrated are interchange of
employees and centralized control of labor relations and standards. This approach too has its
antecedents in the common law of agency, which recognized that a master could be an association
of two or more parties who are employed in a common enterprise, ie., a partnership, M. FERSON,
PRINCIPLES OF AGENCY § 35 (1954). The theory has been applied to hold parent companies liable
for the acts of their subsidiaries under the corporate law doctrine of "piercing the corporate veil,"
where there has been a failure to separately maintain the entities. See generally H. HENN, LAW OF
CORPORATIONS §§ 146-53 (1970). Frequently clouded by verbiage about control, the cases reflect
a judicial recognition that modem corporations are complex entities frequently consisting of mul-
tiple subdivisions.
When applied with regard for statutory objectives, and shorn of verbiage about control, such
an approach is useful. However, the courts should not adopt the narrow approach of disregarding
the corporate entity only where there is some fraudulent or wrongful abuse. But see Hassell v.
Harmon Foods, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 432 (W.D. Tenn. 1971), a'd, 454 F.2d 199 (6th Cir. 1972)
(holding subsidiary to be separate employer for purposes of Title VII where subsidiary was not a
"sham," control exercised by parent was exercised in usual way through election of subsidiary's
board and officers, the affairs were handled separately, subsidiary constituted separate entity for
tax purposes, and parent would not be liable for any of subsidiary's debts). One scholar has
maintained that regardless of the enunciated formulas, "liability is imposed to reach an equitable
result." E. LATTY, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATED CORPORATIONS, 191 (1936). For a rare case of
judicial candor on this issue see, In re Clarke's Will, 204 Minn. 575, 578-79, 284 N.W. 876, 878(1939). The equities which govern the interpretation of fair employment legislation should be the
broad remedial objectives of such statutes. Courts should not blindly adopt common law concepts
without first recognizing that the context in which they are used dictates that careful consideration
be given to legislative policy.
65. See Woodford v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 369 F. Supp. 911 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (district manager
of parent corporation could veto subsidiary's hiring decisions and had authority to transfer subsid-
iary employees). But see Brennan v. Ace Hardware Corp., 362 F. Supp. 1156 (D. Neb. 1973),
aff'd, 495 F.2d 368 (8th Cir. 1974) (holding branch warehouse not to be a separate employer even
though labor relations were controlled by local branch, and management decisions in the form of
orders, payments, information and advice were rendered by main office).
In confronting the issue of who is an "employer" under § 2(2) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act 29, U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976), the courts and the NLRB have struggled with the same
question of which type of control is more relevant. An example is the problem of determining
whether a private contractor which provides services in governmental facilities is an agent of the
facility and therefore exempt from the act as a public employer, or whether it retains its private
character and remains subject to the act as a statutory employer. In NLRB v. Howard Johnson
Co., 317 F.2d I (3d Cir. 1963), the Third Circuit recognized that of the two criteria, control over
labor relations was more relevant than control over business operations when it stated, "we think
control of the employment relationship is of paramount significance." Id at 2. In this area the
NLRB has vascillated. See Ohio Inns, Inc., 205 N.L.R.B. 528 (1973); Slater Corp., 197 N.L.R.B.
1282 (1972) (stressing control over labor relations); Wackenhut Corp., 203 N.L.R.B. 86 (1973)
(emphasizing control over business operations); Servomation Mathias Pa., Inc., 200 N.L.R.B. 1063
(1972) (simultaneously considering the degree of both forms of control).
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this seems relevant to the inquiry and certainly makes the concept more
concrete. It further insulates from liability a parent company which is
otherwise innocent of any wrongdoing on the part of its subsidiary.
However, the consequence of such a narrow focus may serve to under-
mine the purposes of the Act, rendering it mere paper protection for the
employees of smaller subsidiaries, if the parent company, despite all
efforts to integrate the entities, neglects to retain control over labor rela-
tions. Indeed, the usual situation may very well involve the delegation
of responsibility over personnel practices to the local firm, while con-
trol over business practices is retained by the parent.
Control over labor relations, although an important factor, is not
essential to the creation of the employment relation. In most cases it
will be an inevitable incident of the relation. Where it does not exist,
the economic relationship between parent and subsidiary should take
on added importance. When interpreting other labor reform statutes,
courts in the past have been guided by economic reality in their deci-
sions to abandon the control test.66 On occasion, when construing simi-
lar social welfare legislation, the Supreme Court has abandoned
constraining common law concepts in favor of an approach which rec-
ognizes, in addition to economic reality, the underlying statutory pur-
poses to be the guiding consideration. 67 Applying this approach to the
ADEA, in a close case the balance should be struck in favor of, rather
than against, the Act's coverage in order to fulfill its broad and
beneficient purposes. Narrow construction only serves to defeat the
ADEA's policy of eradicating age discrimination in employment. 68
Employers Engaged in An Industry Affecting Commerce. In addi-
tion to meeting the statutory minimum number of employees, the com-
pany must be "engaged in an industry affecting commerce. '69 This
66. See M. FERSON, PRINCIPLES OF AGENCY § 43 (1954) and cases cited therein.
67. See Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126 (1947) (Social Security Act); United States v.
Silk, 331 U.S. 704 (1947) (same); Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722 (1947) (Fair
Labor Standards Act); NLRB v. Hearst Public., Inc., 322 U.S. Ill (1944) (National Labor Rela-
tions Act). For a recent lower court application of this economic reality-statutory purpose ap-
proach, see Mednick v. Albert Enterprises, 508 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1975).
68. Cf. United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 721 (1947) (Rutledge, J., concurring).
69. ADEA § I l(b), 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1976). Two sections which are correlative to § 1 l(b)
are §§ 11 (g) and 11(h), 29 U.S.C. §§ 630(g), 630(h) (1976). Section 1 (g) provides:
The term "commerce" means trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, transmission, or
communication among the several States; or between a State and any place outside
thereof; or within the District of Columbia, or a possession of the United States; or be-
tween points in the same State but through a point outside thereof.
Section I l(h) of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 630(h) provides:
The term "industry affecting commerce" means any activity, business or industry in
commerce or in which a labor dispute would hinder or obstruct commerce or the free
flow of commerce and includes any activity or industry "affecting commerce" within the
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phrase reaches the fullest breadth of the Constitution's commerce
clause. Thus, if a firm uses or sells goods obtained outside the state
where it does business, or serves individuals from outside the state, the
Act will apply if all other definitional requirements are met.
70
Multinational Corporations. Firms engaged in international com-
merce may also qualify as an employer under the ADEA. Thus, do-
mestic contractors working abroad are covered as to their local hiring
practices for foreign work even though their principal effect may be
overseas. 7' Similarly, local subsidiaries of foreign firms are covered if
they meet the statutory requirements. The Wage and Hour Division
had taken the position that if the total number of a firm's foreign and
domestic personnel totals twenty or more, the enterprise constitutes an
"employer" under the Act.72
Employment Agencies
Employment agencies are covered by the Act and are prohibited
from referring prospective employees on the basis of age. 73 Under the
Act, any person or agent who regularly undertakes with or without
compensation to find employees for an "employer" is an employment
meaning of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1947 [29 U.S.C.
§ 402(c)].
70. See Wage and Hour Opinion Letter (Sept. 7, 1968); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). Two Title VII cases illustrate the scope of the "industry affecting
commerce" concept. In Presseisen v. Swarthmore College, 386 F. Supp. 1337 (E.D. Pa. 1974), the
court held that because Swarthmore College attracts students and faculty from all parts of the
country, the college was engaged in an activity "affecting commerce" under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
In EEOC v. Rinella & Rinella, 401 F. Supp. 175 (N.D. 11. 1975), a small law firm engaged prima-
rily in divorce work was held to be "affecting commerce" because the firm's business included
some probate, corporate and real estate work, and because the firm's business often required the
attorneys to travel out of state.
71. Wage and Hour Opinion Letter (Sept. 7, 1968).
72. Wage and Hour Opinion Letter (Dec. 29, 1970).
73. ADEA § 4(b), 29 U.S.C. § 623(b) (1976) provides:
It shall be unlawful for an employment agency to fail or refuse to refer for employ-
ment, or otherwise to discriminate against, any individual because of such individual's
age, or to classify or refer for employment any individual on the basis of such individ-
ual's age.
This is virtually identical to Title VII prohibitions against discrimination by employment agen-
cies. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b) (1976).
While most states include employment agencies in their coverage, nine states and Puerto Rico
do not. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1420.1 (West Supp. 1980) (Employment agencies may be covered
if agents of the employer); COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-116 (1973); GA. CODE ANN. § 54-1102 (1974);
IDAHO CODE § 44-1602 (1977); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-9-2-1 (Bums 1974 & Supp. 1980); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 23:893 (West 1964 & Supp. 1980); N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-01-17 (1979); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 4101.17 (Page 1980); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, § 146 (Supp. 1979); TEX. Civ. CODE
ANN. tit. I 10A, § 6252-14 (1970). Those states that do extend coverage to employment agencies
generally follow the ADEA's prohibitions. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-3501 to -3505 (1979);
Ky. REV. STAT. § 344.050 (Supp. 1980).
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agency. 74 Under both the DOL's interpretations and the EEOC's pro-
posed interpretations, if an employment agency regularly finds employ-
ees for at least one covered employer, it is subject to the ADEA with
regard to all its activities.7" Thus, a covered agency can be subject to
the Act's provisions even when acting on behalf of a noncovered em-
ployer.
There is little case law on the subject of what is an employment
agency under the ADEA. As with other sections which are analogous
to the provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, resort may be
made to that statute's judicial development in an effort to predict the
judicial treatment of the ADEA. 76 Litigation under Title VII concern-
ing the meaning of an employment agency is sparse and has been pri-
marily confined to cases involving the publication by newspapers of
sex-segregated help wanted advertisements 77 and the maintenance of
college placement bureaus. 78 The concern in these cases has been with
the degree of involvement in the referral process in relation to the pri-
mary purpose of the enterprise. Thus, where a newspaper merely acted
as a conduit in the printing of employment information, it was not con-
sidered an employment agency. 79 Where the paper reserved editorial
authority to classify copy, however, it was held to have satisfied the
statutory definition. 80 Similarly, where the placement activities of a
college were merely incidental to its educational function, it was held
74. ADEA § I I(c), 29 U.S.C. § 630(c) (1976) provides:
The term "employment agency" means any person regularly undertaking with or
without compensation to procure employees for an employer and includes an agent of
such a person; but shall not include an agency of the United States.
§ 70 1(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(c) (1976) is similar:
The term "employment agency" means any person regularly undertaking with or
without compensation to procure employees for an employer or to procure for employees
opportunities to work for an employer and includes an agent of such a person.
75. 29 C.F.R. § 860.35(b) (1979); Proposed Interpretations, supra note 12, § 1625.3. See
Brennan v. Root, 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. 9531 (E.D.N.C. 1974) (rejecting employment agency's
argument that it was not covered unless the client involved was a covered employer); accord,
Brennan v. C/M Mobile, Inc., 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 551 (S.D. Ala. 1974).
76. See note 73 supra.
77. See Greenfield v. Field Enterprises, Inc., 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 548 (N.D. I11. 1972);
Morrow v. Mississippi Publishers Corp., 5 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 287 (S.D. Miss. 1972); Brush v.
San Francisco Newspaper Printing Co., 315 F. Supp. 577 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aft'd, 469 F.2d 89 (9th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 943 (1973).
78. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 406 F. Supp. 1257 (N.D. I11.), aff'd, 559 F.2d 1063
(7th Cir. 1976), rev'don other grounds, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (decided under the ADEA); Kaplowitz
v. University of Chicago, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1131 (N.D. I11. 1974) (decided under Title VII).
79. See Greenfield v. Field Enterprises, Inc., 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 548 (N.D. Ill. 1972);
Brush v. San Francisco Newspaper Printing Co., 315 F. Supp. 577 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aft'd, 469
F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 943 (1973).
80. See Morrow v. Mississippi Publishers Corp., 5 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 287 (S.D. Miss.
1972).
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not to be an employment agency. 8' However, where there was a signifi-
cant involvement in the maintenance of a placement bureau which op-
erated as the principal method by which graduates sought employment,
the college was held to be an employment agency. 82 The thrust of this
approach is the simple recognition that those primarily engaged in re-
ferral activity are better suited to bear the burden of compliance.83
In contrast to the Act's definition of an "employer," an employ-
ment agency need not possess a minimum number of employees to be
covered.84 The Act's definition does not exclude even the smallest busi-
ness. Neither the statute nor its legislative history discloses the ration-
ale for this distinction.
This distinction raises the question of whether an employment
agency charged with discriminating against its own employees must
meet the statutory definition of an employer. Under the DOL's inter-
pretations, which the EEOC proposes to adopt, such age discrimination
is unlawful even if the employment agency has less than twenty em-
ployees and otherwise would not be covered by the Act as an em-
ployer.85 The rationale offered is that the Act prohibits an employment
agency from discriminating in its referral practices "or otherwise to dis-
criminate against any individual" on the basis of age. It is reasoned
that such an inclusion of other discriminatory practices along with the
prohibition against discrimination in employment referral includes acts
against the agency's own employees.8 6 Under this interpretation, the
employees of employment agencies achieve a privileged position under
the Act, since by virtue of their employer's status in an employment
81. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 406 F. Supp. 1257 (N.D. Ill.), a f'd, 559 F.2d 1063
(7th Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (decided under the ADEA).
82. Kaplowitz v. University of Chicago, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1131 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
83. In Brush v. San Francisco Newspaper Printing Co., 315 F. Supp. 577, 581 (1970), the
court noted that an employment agency under § 4(f) of the ADEA may legally engage in discrimi-
natory referral practices where age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary
to the normal operation of the particular business. It concluded that it would be unreasonable to
expect a newspaper to make the necessary personnel and procedural arrangements to police its
advertisers, whereas firms primarily engaged in referral activity normally maintain such proce-
dures.
84. ADEA § 11(c), 29 U.S.C. § 630(c) (1976). Similarly, Title VII does not require a mini-
mum number of employees for an employment agency to be covered. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(c)
(1976).
85. 29 C.F.R. § 860.36(c) (1979); Proposed Interpretations, supra note 12, § 1625.3.
86. 29 C.F.R. 860.36(c) (1979). The EEOC's Proposed Interpretations, supra note 12,
§ 1625.3, do not contain the rationale provided by the DOL's interpretations. In the supplemental
information section, the EEOC notes that many deletions were made for stylistic purposes. 44
Fed. Reg. 68859 (1979). Because the same result obtains under both interpretations, it is logical to
assume the same rationale has operated upon the EEOC determination.
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agency they need not establish the statutory minimum required of
other employers.
Although such a literal reading of the Act may be technically cor-
rect, such an interpretation serves to read out of the Act the distinction
accorded by Congress between employment agencies and employers. It
is submitted that the purpose of including employment agencies in the
ADEA's coverage is to prohibit age discrimination in referrals and
other employment agency activities outside the employer-employee re-
lationship. In confronting this issue the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York rejected the agency's interpreta-
tion and held that where an employment agency acts merely as an em-
ployer, the agency is not covered by the Act unless it meets the
statutory requirements of an "employer. 87
Unions
Labor organizations are covered by the ADEA in a variety of
ways. They are included in the definition of "persons, ' 88 and therefore
may qualify as an employer or employment agency by virtue of the
inclusion of that term in their statutory definitions.89 The definition of
"labor organizations" also includes any employee representative.90
Furthermore, they may be covered if they are engaged in an industry
affecting commerce, ie., if they maintain a hiring hall or have twenty-
five members.9 1
PROHIBITIONS AND THEIR PROOF
Prohibitions and Requirements in General
The ADEA's prohibitions generally parallel those contained in Ti-
tle VII.92 Employers are prohibited from discriminating in hiring,
87. Brennan v. Paragon Empl. Agency, 356 F. Supp. 286 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd mem., 489
F.2d 752 (2d Cir. 1974).
88. ADEA § 1 (a), 29 U.S.C. § 630(a) (1976).
89. See notes 48 & 74 supra.
90. ADEA § 1 l(d), 29 U.S.C. § 630(d) (1976).
91. Id. § 11(e), 29 U.S.C. § 630(e) (1976).
Only eight states do not extend coverage to labor organizations. See CAL. LAB. CODE
§ 1420.1 (West Supp. 1980); COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-116 (1973); GA. CODE ANN. § 54-1102
(1974); IDAHO CODE 44-1602 (1977); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:893 (West 1964 & Supp. 1980);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-01-17 (1979); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4101.17 (Page 1980); TEX. CIv.
CODE ANN. tit. I10A, § 14 (1970).
Those states prohibiting age discrimination by labor organizations tend to follow the provi-
sions found in the ADEA. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 16(c) (1979).
92. Cf. ADEA § 4(a)-(e), 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)-(e) (1976) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)-(c) (1976).
Like the ADEA, state age discrimination statutes prohibit a variety of employer practices.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 23.167(1) (Supp. 1980). A few states narrowly define the prohibited
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compensation or other conditions of employment against persons be-
tween the ages of 40 and 70.93 Any segregation or classification of the
employees is unlawful when it is based on age.94 When there has been
discrimination in the payment of wages, the employer cannot cure the
violation by reducing the higher wage rate.95 Employment agencies are
not permitted to refer prospective employees to employers on the basis
of age.96 Unions are prohibited from excluding from membership any
individual because of age.97 As with employers, they cannot segregate
or classify their membership; and like employment agencies they are
not allowed to discriminate in their referral activity.98 This latter pro-
hibition primarily is directed to union hiring hall practices prevalent in
the construction and shipping industries. It is additionally unlawful for
a union to cause an employer to discriminate on the basis of age.99
In addition to the specific prohibitions provided for each covered
entity, the ADEA contains certain prohibitions which are common to
all. Thus it is a violation of the Act for employers, employment agen-
cies and unions to indicate any preference or age discrimination in a
published notice or advertisement. °0 Furthermore, covered entities
may not engage in retaliatory action against individuals for participat-
ing in proceedings or for pursuing rights granted under the ADEA.10
employer practices. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-116 (1973) (only barring the discharge of an
employee because of age); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-9-2-2 (Bums 1974 & Supp. 1980) (prohibiting
only dismissals or refusals to hire because of age); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:893 (West 1964)
(prohibiting age discrimination in the discharge of employees and in rejecting employment appli-
cations); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4101.17 (Page 1980) (forbidding refusal to interview job appli-
cants, and the discharge of employees because of age); and TEX. CIv. CODE ANN. tit. 1 10A,
§ 6252-14 (1970) (declaring age discrimination to be against public policy, but only prohibiting
state agencies and commissions from denying employment because of age).
93. ADEA §§ 4(a)(1), 12, 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a)(1), 631 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
94. Id § 4(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (1976).
95. Id § 4(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(3) (1976). This provision is similar to one found in the
Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(I) (1976). Thus an employer who is guilty of paying a 62 year
old employee 50¢ an hour less than a 30 year old worker cannot lower the younger worker's wage,
but must raise the wage rate of the older employee until it is equivalent to the younger worker's.
29 C.F.R. § 860.75 (1976). The Secretary had promulgated regulations interpreting the term
"compensation" and giving examples of the conditions of employment which § 4(a) was intended
to include. See id § 860.50.
96. ADEA § 4(b), 29 U.S.C. § 623(b) (1976).
97. Id § 4(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 623(c)(1) (1976).
98. Id § 4(c)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 623(c)(2) (1976).
99. Id § 4(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 623(c)(3) (1976).
100. Id § 4(e), 29 U.S.C. § 623(e) (1976). See also 29 C.F.R. § 860.92 (1979) and Proposed
Interpretations, supra note 12, § 1625.4 for examples of prohibited practices.
Most state age discrimination statutes also prohibit the use of discriminatory advertisements.
However, seven states do not. See GA. CODE ANN. § 54-1102 (1974); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48 884
(1979); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 22-9-2-2, -3 (Bums, 1974 & Supp. 1980); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 23:893 (West 1964 & Supp. 1980); N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-01-17 (1979); OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4101.17 (Page 1980); TEXAS CIV. CODE ANN. tit. 110A, § 6252-14 (1970).
101. ADEA § 4(d), 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (1976). Title VII § 704(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)
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Certain affirmative requirements also are imposed on all those
covered by the Act. Employers, employment agencies and unions are
required to maintain a conspicuously posted notice explaining the Act's
provisions. 0 2 Record keeping requirements also have been imposed
on all covered entities in order to effectuate the administration of the
Act. 10 3
Proof of Violation. The Prima Facie Case
The Supreme Court has established the essential elements of a
prima facie case of employment discrimination in several cases involv-
ing Title VII.104 Although no high court decision exists with regard to
the prima facie case of age discrimination, the Court's decisions within
the context of Title VII should serve in cases involving the ADEA.
Under Title VII, the requirements of a plaintiffs prima facie case de-
pend upon whether the individual alleges that he has been subjected to
"disparate treatment" because of his race, religion, national origin or
sex; or that he has been the victim of a facially neutral practice having
a "disparate impact" on his racial or religious group, or on others of his
national origin or sex.
The Supreme Court established the elements of a prima facie case
(1976) has a similar prohibition against retaliation. See Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co.,
411 F.2d 998 (5th Cir. 1969). This protection applies only as long as the employee activity is
lawful. See also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
102. ADEA § 8, 29 U.S.C. § 627 (1976). The Secretary of Labor has prepared a notice which
may be utilized. See I EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE 1861, 1863 (CCH 1980). Regulations issued under
§ 8 by the Secretary of Labor require this notice to be posted in "prominent and accessible places
where it can readily be observed by employees, applicants for employment and union members."
29 C.F.R. 850.10 (1979).
103. See ADEA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 626 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). Employers are required to
maintain payroll or other records on each employee for three years. These records must contain
the employee's name, address, date of birth, occupation, pay rate and compensation earned each
week. 29 C.F.R. 850.3(a) (1979). Furthermore, employers are required to retain for one year any
records normally kept of job applications and their disposition; job orders delivered to employ-
ment agencies and unions for recruitment purposes; test papers disclosing results of employee-
administered tests considered by the employer in the selection process; physical examination re-
sults considered by the employer in connection with a personnel action; advertisements and no-
tices relating to job openings, training programs, promotions or opportunities for overtime work;
records relating to the promotion, demotion, transfer, selection for training, lay-offs, recall or dis-
charge of any employee; and copies of employee benefit plans and seniority or merit systems (to
be kept a year after such plan has been terminated). Id
Employment agencies must keep for one year any records normally kept of placements, refer-
rals for specific job openings, job orders from employers, job applications from individuals; appli-
cant test papers; and advertisements for job notices. Id § 850.4(a).
Labor unions must maintain current records identifying members by name, address and date
of birth, id § 850.5(a), and must keep for a year a record of the name, address and age of all
applicants for membership. Id § 850.5(b).
104. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792 (1973).
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of employment discrimination through disparate treatment in McDon-
nell Douglas Corp. v. Green, °105 a Title VII case involving a refusal to
rehire because of alleged unlawful racial discrimination. In McDonnell
Douglas, the Court affirmed what has been the general understanding
under both Title VII and the ADEA that the plaintiff bears the initial
burden of establishing a prima facie case of employment discrimina-
tion. 0 6 The Court held that the plaintiff had established such a case
where he proved that he belonged to a racial minority; that he applied
and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking appli-
cants; that despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and that, after his
rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued
seeking applicants with the plaintiffs qualifications. 107 The thrust of
this approach is to require complainants to establish on a comparative
basis that they have been denied an employment opportunity which
they are qualified to perform. After the plaintiff establishes a prima
facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to state a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for its action. 08 The Court further added a third
stage to this process by holding that the plaintiff is to be accorded a
final opportunity to establish that the reason offered by the defendant is
a mere pretext. 0 9
Where the claim is that a facially neutral employment practice has
a disparate impact on a group protected by Title VII, the Court has
articulated a different method of establishing the claim. The Court de-
fined the prima facie case on a disparate impact claim in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co. ,lO a Title VII case involving the legality of an employer's
use of a high school diploma requirement and standardized intelligence
tests for employee selection. The Court in Griggs held that a prima
facie case on a disparate impact claim is made by proof that the partic-
ular practice operates to exclude a disproportionate number of mem-
105. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
106. Id. at 802. See also Bittar v. Air Canada, 512 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1975); Hodgson v. First
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 455 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1972); Mastie v. Great Lakes Steel Corp., 424 F.
Supp. 1299 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Bishop v. JelleffAssoc., 398 F. Supp. 579 (D.D.C. 1974); Schulz v.
Hickok Mfg. Co., 358 F. Supp. 1208 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
107. 411 U.S. at 802. For an example of how the McDonnell Douglas prima facie proof can be
adapted to a case brought under the ADEA, see Wilson v. Sealtest Foods, 501 F.2d 84, 86 (5th Cir.
1974), which held that "a showing that Appellant was within the protected class, was asked to take
early retirement against his will, was doing apparently satisfactory work, and was replaced by a
younger person, will not permit dismissal." See also O'Connell v. Ford Motor Co., 11 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. 1471 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
108. 411 U.S. at 802. See notes 135-40 infra and accompanying text. See also Hodgson v.
First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 455 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1972).
109. 411 U.S. at 804.
110. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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bers of the protected group from an employment opportunity. I"' Once
the plaintiff has established the disparate impact of the practice, the
burden shifts to the employer to show that the practice is justified by
business necessity. 12
Both the McDonnell Douglas disparate treatment theory and the
Griggs disparate impact theory should be applicable to cases of alleged
age discrimination. Three aspects of the cases are important to em-
ployers: the role of intent, the use of statistics, and the shifts in the
burden of proof in an employment discrimination case.
The Role of Intent. The Court in McDonnell Douglas removed the
problem confronting plaintiffs with regard to proof of an employer's
discriminatory intent. Although, as the Court subsequently stated,
"[p]roof of discriminatory motive is critical" 13 in a disparate treatment
case, plaintiffs need not prove the employer's subjective discriminatory
intent; such an intent can be inferred from the existence of differences
in treatment.' 14
When the burden in a disparate treatment case shifts to the em-
111. Id. at 431.
112. Id.
113. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
114. Id. One circuit court case decided prior to McDonnell Douglas implies that the plaintiff
must prove the employer's subjective discriminatory intent. In Hodgson v. Earnest Machine
Prod., Inc., 479 F.2d 1133 (6th Cir. 1973) (per curiam), the Sixth Circuit upheld a dismissal of the
government's claim becaue the proof failed to establish that the employer had actual knowledge
or had reason to be aware of the complainant's approximate age. That the court reached this
result in light of the fact the complainant was only five months shy of the mandatory retirement
age of 65 is indicative that a subjective intent to discriminate was considered essential to the
government's proof.
It can be argued that proof of subjective intent is not required under the ADEA. Whereas
Title VII empowers a court to grant injunctions, award back pay, order affirmative action and
other equitable relief "[i]f the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is
intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint," 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(g) (1976), the ADEA has no such language. The inclusion of liquidated damages for
willful violations of the ADEA suggests that a subjective intent to discriminate is not to be re-
quired for ordinary violations. See ADEA § 7(b), 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976). See also Rogers v.
Exxon Research & Eng'r Co., 404 F. Supp. 324, 334 (D.N.J. 1974), vacated on other grounds, 550
F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978) where the court stated that "Itihe term
'wilful' . . . must be construed in the civil sense. It therefore applies to violations which are
intentional, knowing or voluntary as distinguished from accidental." However, the differences in
statutory language may indicate that for both Title VII and the ADEA purposes, the discrimina-
tory intent necessary to show a prima facie case of disparate treatment is not the same purposeful
intent in the constitutional sense of the word as required by the Court in finding a violation of the
equal protection clause. That is, under Title VII and the ADEA, the presumption that a person
intends the natural and foreseeable consequences of his voluntary actions should be the test of
discriminatory intent. Viewed this way, the plaintiff in a disparate treatment case brought under
the ADEA must still show discriminatory intent, which may be accomplished by establishing the
McDonnell Douglas prima facie case. Hence the provision for liquidated damages for willful
violations is indicative that such damages may be awarded where the employer exhibits a discrim-
inatory purpose in a constitutional sense of the word. Cf. Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442
U.S. 256, 278-80 (1979).
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ployer to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its con-
duct, proof of intent also is relevant. The ADEA permits employment
practices which are determined on the basis of reasonable factors other
than age." 5 A nondiscriminatory intent is relevant evidence of such a
factor.
Furthermore, evidence of an employer's intent is permitted when
the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove the employer's reason to
be a pretext. Thus plaintiffs may utilize evidence of intent as proof of
the pretextuality of the employer's justification. Facing this possibility,
employers will be well advised to watch what is written on employment
applications and other personnel records." 16
The role of intent in a disparate impact claim is altogether differ-
ent. In Griggs, the Court held that to establish a prima facie case on a
disparate impact claim, a plaintiff need not show that the employer had
a discriminatory intent but need only prove that a particular practice
disproportionately adversely affects the employment opportunities of
members of the protected group." 17 Proof of discriminatory intent is
not required under the disparate impact theory.
The Use of Statistics. Statistical evidence will usually play an im-
portant if not determinative role in an employment discrimination suit.
In claims brought under the disparate impact theory, statistical evi-
dence may support a showing that an employment practice dispropor-
tionately excludes members of the protected group from a job
opportunity. In Griggs, statistical evidence served to prove the discrim-
inatory impact of a facially neutral employment testing device. The
Court held that a statistical profile of a defendant's employee group is
competent evidence for establishing a Title VII claim of disparate im-
pact.' 18 Thus in cases involving the use of facially neutral employment
practices, statistical evidence is relevant because their use in showing
the discriminatory impact of the employment practice serves to estab-
lish individual discrimination on the part of the defendant against the
plaintiff.
Statistical evidence should also play an important role in claims
brought under a disparate treatment theory; however, its use may not
115. ADEA § 4(f)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1976).
116. See Hodgson v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 455 F.2d 818, 821 (5th Cir. 1972), where in
holding that the plaintiff had made out a prima facie case of age discrimination under the ADEA,
the Fifth Circuit emphasized that plaintiffs proof included interview notes with "too old for
teller" written on them.
117. 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
118. Id. at 431. Accord, New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 584 (1979)
(Title VII case).
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be determinative in establishing the plaintiffs prima facie case of indi-
vidual discrimination. The Court in McDonnell Douglas elaborated on
the role of statistical evidence in proving disparate treatment. Notice-
ably omitting any mention of the use of statistics with respect to the
plaintiff's initial burden, the Court did recognize their utility by the
defendant in describing a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its
conduct, and also by the plaintiff when later proving the pretextual na-
ture of the purported justification." 19 Thus, although it has been gener-
ally acknowledged that statistics may be highly significant in cases of
employment discrimination, after McDonnell Douglas their use in dis-
parate treatment cases should be limited to a support role for the plain-
tiff's principal evidence.
In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,' 20 the
company argued "that statistics can never in and of themselves prove
the existence of a pattern or practice of discrimination, or even estab-
lish a prima facie case shifting to the employer the burden of rebutting
the inference raised by the figures."' 2 ' While noting that its case law
made it unmistakably clear that "[s]tatistical analyses have served and
will continue to serve an important role in which the existence of dis-
crimination is a disputed issue," and that "[s]tatistics are . . . compe-
tent in proving employment discrimination,"'' 22 the Supreme Court
nevertheless found that the evidence revealed that this case was not one
in which the Government had relied on statistics alone. Testimony by
individuals about their personal experiences additionally supported the
Government's case. The Teamsters dictum may be further limited to
cases charging a pattern or practice of employment discrimination.' 23
It is similarly doubtful that a case of individual discriminatory
treatment under the ADEA may be made by statistical evidence alone.
In Hodgson v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association ,'124 the Fifth
Circuit, citing statistics showing that none of the three defendants' 35
tellers was over 40 years of age, and all but three were in their teens
and twenties, pointedly remarked that "statistics by themselves would
perhaps support a finding that defendant had violated the Act."' 25
However, the court noted that the Secretary did not rest his case on
statistics alone but introduced evidence of specific incidents of discrimi-
119. 411 U.S. at 805.
120. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
121. Id. at 339.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. 455 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1972).
125. Id. at 822-23.
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natory conduct by the defendant. 126
In Mastie v. Great Lakes Steel Corp. ,127 the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan held that statistics cannot be
used exclusively to prove a prima facie violation of the ADEA. Plain-
tiffs in Mastie had argued that statistics showed that the average age of
evaluated employees dropped 1.29 years. 28 While acknowledging that
the Sixth Circuit had approved the use of statistical evidence in claims
of individual discrimination, the district court noted that such evidence
became significant only where great discrepancies were revealed.' 29
The court further found that institutional, psychological, economic and
physiological constraints in employing the aged distort the normal sta-
tistical patterns that would be expected in the employment of older per-
sons and thus reduce the reliability of statistics as an indicator of an
employer's violation of the ADEA. 130
Although statistics may not serve to exclusively establish a prima
facie case of disparate treatment, their importance to an employer in
articulating a nondiscriminatory reason for its action has been recog-
nized by the Supreme Court. In Furnco Construction Corp. v. Wa-
ters,'31 the Court reversed the Seventh Circuit's decision that the
employer had failed to rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case of disparate
treatment on the basis of race; the Court held that the circuit court
erred in its treatment of the employer's statistical evidence. The circuit
court had held that once a McDonnell Douglas prima facie case had
been established, statistics of a racially balanced work force were to-
tally irrelevant to the question of motive. 132 While agreeing that the
statistical proof in the case could not have been sufficient to conclu-
sively demonstrate that the employer's actions were not discriminato-
rily motivated, the Court nevertheless held that the district court was
entitled to consider the employer's statistical evidence. 133 Since de-
126. Id.
127. 424 F. Supp. 1299 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
128. Id. at 1319.
129. Id. at 1319-20.
130. The district court explained:
In particular, the court feels that the following employment restraints operate against
older persons in their quest for employment: higher costs of employing older persons,
promotion of employees from the employer's own work force, maintaining a proper
work force age distribution, the older applicant's inability effectively to find and inter-
view for employment, unwillingness of older persons to accept training for required
skills, and the greater physical difficulties encountered by older persons.
Id. at 1320.
131. 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
132. Id. at 579.
133. Id. at 580.
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fendants may use statistics to meet their burden of proof, employers
should maintain a statistical profile of their work force to document the
utilization of older personnel.
The Proof Process. Under both Griggs and McDonnell Douglas,
once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of employment discrim-
ination, the burden of proof shifts to the employer. Under Griggs the
burden shifts to the employer to establish that its employment practice
is justified by business necessity. 134 Under McDonnell Douglas the bur-
den shifts to the employer to articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for
its action. 35 Until recently it was unclear whether the Court's decision
required a shifting of the burden of persuasion or merely the burden of
production. Most courts read the decisions as requiring a shift of both
burdens.' 36 In Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,'37
the Court last term held that in a disparate treatment case "[tihe ulti-
mate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant inten-
tionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all time with the
plaintiff." 38 The defendant will rebut the prima facie case by articulat-
ing lawful reasons for his actions. "(T]o satisfy this intermediate bur-
den, the employer need only produce admissible evidence which would
allow the trier of fact rationally to conclude that the employment deci-
sion had not been motivated by discriminatory animus."' 39 Therefore,
the defendant bears the burden of production rather than the burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence the legitimate reasons for
the employment action.140
The Burdine holding should find ready acceptance by the courts
considering cases brought under the ADEA. Even before Burdine, the
Sixth Circuit had refused to shift both burdens in an age discrimination
case. 141 As a result, employers need not feel compelled to err in favor
of older workers in their personnel decisionmaking, since they will not
be forced to legitimatize their decisions by a preponderance of the evi-
dence.
134. In Griggs, the Court explained that "[tihe touchstone is business necessity. If an employ-
ment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job perform-
ance, the practice is prohibited." 401 U.S. at 431.
135. 411 U.S. at 802.
136. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. East Texas Motor Freight, 505 F.2d 40, 58 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated
on other grounds, 431 U.S. 395 (1977); Vulcan Soc'y v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 490 F.2d 387 (2d Cir.
1973); Holthaus v. Compton & Sons, 514 F.2d 651 (8th Cir. 1975).
137. 101 S. Ct. 1089 (1981).
138. Id. at 1093.
139. Id. at 1096.
140. Id. at 1093.
141. See Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1975).
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Establishing the Exception
Notwithstanding the ADEA's prohibitions, the Act provides cer-
tain exceptions which if established will exonerate a defendant's ac-
tions. Thus it is permissible for an employer to discriminate on the
basis of age "where age is a bona fide occupational qualification rea-
sonably necessary to the normal operations of a particular business." 142
Practices based on reasonable factors other than age, 4 3 and discharges
or other discipline of individuals for cause 44 also are allowed. Further
allowance is made for discriminatory practices which are pursuant to a
bona fide seniority system or an employee benefit plan. 145 In addition
to these exceptions, the Secretary of Labor was initially authorized to
establish any additional exceptions which are necessary to the public
interest. 46 This authority to establish administrative exceptions now
142. ADEA § 4(0(I), 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(I) (1976).
143. Id
144. Id § 4(0(3), 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(3) (Supp. III 1979).
145. Id § 4(0(2), 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(2) (Supp. III 1979).
146. Id § 9, 29 U.S.C. § 628 (1976). Pursuant to § 9 the Secretary of Labor exempted all
programs under federal grants and contracts and those undertaken by state employment services
the sole purpose of which is to provide employment to persons with special employment problems,
which include the long-term unemployed, handicapped persons, members of minority groups,
older workers, and youth. 29 C.F.R. § 850.16 (1979).
Several state statutes contain exemptions similar to those found in the ADEA. See ALASKA
STAT. § 18:80:220 (1974); CAL. LAB. CODE § 1420.1 (West Supp. 1980); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 378-
9 (1976); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4573 (1979); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 4 (1971 &
Supp. 1980); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:8 (Supp. 1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (West
Supp. 1980); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-7 (1978); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-7 (1979 & Supp. 1980);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-35-6(2)(a) (Supp. 1979); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 49.60.180-.200 (Supp.
1980). Seventeen states exempt bona fide occupational qualifications and additionally exempt
bona fide employee benefit plans and/or bona fide seniority plans. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1420.1
(West Supp. 1980); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-126 (West Supp. 1980); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19,
§ 71 1(e) (1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 112.044(3)(0, 23.167(8) (West Supp. 1980); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 54-1102 (1974); IDAHO CODE § 44-1602 (1977); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48 883 (1979); IND. CODE
ANN. § 22-9-2-10 (Bums 1974 & Supp. 1980); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 16(g) (1979); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.2202(2) (Supp. 1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03 (Supp. 1980); N.Y.
EXEC. LAW § 296(3-a) (Supp. 1980); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 659.028, 659.030 (1979); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 43, § 955(a) (Purdon 1964); S.C. CODE § 1-13-80(h) (Supp. 1980); W. VA. CODE § 5-11-9(a)
(1979); Wis. STAT. ANN. § !I1.32(5)(c) (West 1974). Nine states and Puerto Rico allow exemp-
tions which fall short of a bona fide occupational qualification, allowing age discrimination where
age is one of a number of factors considered. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT, § 8-2-116 (1973) ("No
person, firm, association, or corporation. . . shall discharge any individual . . . solely and only
upon the ground of age"). See also IOWA CODE ANN. § 601A.6(2) (West Supp. 1980); Ky. REV.
STAT. §§ 344.090-.1 10 (1977 & Supp. 1980); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23.892 (West 1964 & Supp.
1980); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-303 (1979); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1003 (Supp. 1980); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 613.350 (1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-01-17 (1979); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4101.17
(Page 1980); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, §§ 146-147 (Supp. 1979); TEX. CIV. CODE ANN. tit. I 10A,
§ 6252-14 (1970). A few states have exemptions not found in the ADEA. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT.
§ 18.80.300(3) (1974) (exempting religious, charitable, social, educational and fraternal organiza-
tions); IOWA CODE ANN. § 601A.6(2)(d) (West Supp. 1980) (exempting religious institutions); TEX.
CIV. CODE ANN. tit. I 10A, § 6252-14 (1970) (exempting "law enforcement peace officers and fire
fighters").
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resides in the EEOC. 147
Age as a Bona Fide Occupation Qualfication. The exception pro-
vided to age-based personnel practices where age is a bona fide occu-
pational qualification 48 is a recognition that the purpose of the ADEA
is to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination against those who are quali-
fied to do a job notwithstanding their age; that the Act is not intended
to require the employment of those who are not qualified for a particu-
lar position. In its guidelines, the Department of Labor issued exam-
ples narrowly construing the exception, showing occupations involving
the portrayal by actors of young or elderly characters and the hiring of
persons to promote products directed toward young or elderly consum-
ers (e.g., the Gerber baby). 149 The thrust of these guidelines was to
focus on the authenticity of the age requirement as an essential element
of the job. The EEOC's proposed interpretations contain a similar pro-
vision. 1-50
Since the ADEA's bfoq provision is virtually identical to that of
Title VII, and the ADEA's interpretative guidelines are similar to the
EEOC's interpretations of Title VII, it is not surprising that courts have
applied Title VII precedents when defining a bfoq under the ADEA.
Three Fifth Circuit cases, Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone and Tele-
graph ,151 Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. 152 and Usery v.
Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc. ,'153 are the principal cases defining a bfoq.
147. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
148. [Hereinafter referred to as a bfoq].
149. 29 C.F.R. § 860.102 (1979). The DOL guidelines additionally state that any federal stat-
ute providing a compulsory age disqualification will constitute a bfoq where such disqualification
is "clearly imposed for the safety and convenience of the public." The policy of exempting federal
statutory disqualifications has not extended to state protective legislation. The EEOC has taken
the position that all such protective laws violate Title VII. EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.2(b) (1979). This position has met with judicial approval. See Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel.
& Tel., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969) (overruling via the Federal Constitution's supremacy clause
the district court's holding that the burden of proving a bfoq under Title VII was met with a
showing of reliance on a state protective law). See also Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co., 444
F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971); Czerw v. General Motors Corp., 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1322 (N.D.
Ohio 1973); LeBlanc v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 333 F. Supp. 602 (E.D. La. 1971), aft'd, 460
F.2d 1228 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 990 (1972); Ridlinger v. General
Motors Corp., 325 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D. Ohio 1971), rev'don other grounds, 474 F.2d 949 (6th Cir.
1972); Richards v. Griffith Rubber Mills, 300 F. Supp. 338 (D. Ore. 1969).
150. Under the DOL approach, the inquiry is to ascertain whether the job in question is one
that any person of the particular age group excluded can handle. The issue is resolved by answer-
ing the following: "Is it absolutely necessary that a person of the particular age in question per-
form the job?" If so, the guidelines recognize that particular age as a bfoq. If not, the guidelines
require the employer to make the employment decision on an individual basis, taking into consid-
eration the qualifications possessed by each worker. For the EEOC approach, see Proposed Inter-
pretations, supra note 12, § 1625.6.
151. 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
152. 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
153. 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976).
AGE DISCRIMINATION
In Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph, the plaintiff
was denied a switchman position even though her seniority would have
entitled her to the job. 5 4 The company maintained that the position's
arduous responsibilities, which included lifting over thirty pounds, ren-
dered women physically unsuited for the job. An EEOC investigation,
however, failed to show that the job could not be performed by women
in general, and the plaintiff maintained that she was capable of per-
forming the job. 5 5 Deferring to the Commission's guidelines requiring
that individuals be considered on the basis of individual capacities and
not on characteristics generally attributed to groups as a whole, the
court held that Southern Bell did not meet its burden of proof merely
by showing conclusions based on stereotypes; the bfoq exception re-
quires a factual showing that the employer had reasonable cause to
believe that all or substantially all women would be unable to perform
safely and efficiently the duties of the job. 156 Absent this showing, the
employer must individually assess the abilities of each worker. The
court in dicta noted that unverified yet reasonable generalizations
based on sex may be permitted where it would be impossible or highly
impracticable to make individual determinations. 5 7
The Weeks bfoq formula was elaborated upon in Diaz v. Pan
American World Airways, Inc. ,158 where a male was denied a job as a
flight attendant. The trial court agreed with the airline's contention
that the exception should apply because of passenger preference indi-
cating that women were superior to men in the nonmechanical func-
tions of the job, such as attending to the psychological needs of
passengers by providing a pleasurable environment. 5 9 The Fifth Cir-
cuit, however, held that the bfoq exception requires the application of a
business necessity test, not a business convenience test; this means that
sex can constitute a bfoq only where the essence of the business opera-
tion would be undermined by not hiring members of one sex exclu-
sively.' 60 The court found that the nonmechanical aspects of a flight
attendant position were not enough to qualify the job for the exception,
since they were not "reasonably necessary to the normal operation of
the particular business."' 16 1 The court noted that Pan Am had not sug-
154. 408 F.2d at 230.
155. Id at 234.
156. Id at 235.
157. Id at 235 n.5.
158. 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
159. Id at 387.
160. Id at 388.
161. Id
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gested that having male attendants would so seriously affect the opera-
tion of the business as to jeopardize or minimize the airline's ability to
provide safe transportation. 62
Taken together, Weeks and Diaz establish that before sex can con-
stitute a bfoq, it must be shown that (1) it is impracticable to find mem-
bers of one sex who possess the abilities which members of the other
sex possess, and (2) that those abilities are necessary to the performance
of the job. Referred to as the Weeks-Diaz formula, in application it is
the Diaz element which is considered first in the analysis. The initial
thrust of the judicial inquiry is to ascertain the business necessity of the
qualifications invoked by the employer to justify its discrimination; the
Diaz element. Once it is established that the qualifications are neces-
sary for job performance, the Weeks element must be met to establish
that it is impracticable to find members of the excluded class who meet
these qualifications; i e., there may be a factual basis for believing that
substantially all persons of a specified sex would be unable to perform
safely and efficiently the duties of the job, or it may be impossible or
impracticable to determine through medical examinations, periodic re-
views of job performance and other objective tests the capacities or
abilities of these people to perform the job safely and efficiently.
In Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc. ,163 the Fifth Circuit had oc-
casion to apply its bfoq formula in an age discrimination case involving
an intercity bus carrier's policy of refusing to hire applicants over age
forty for the position of bus driver. Applying the Weeks-Diaz formula,
the circuit court upheld the lower court's decision that Tamiami had
justified its policy under the exception by (1) showing that it had a fac-
tual basis for believing that its business operations (safe transporta-
tion) would be undermined by hiring drivers over 40 years of age, and
(2) by demonstrating that the individual testing of applicants was im-
practicable. 64 The circuit court observed that the Diaz requirement
that an employer show its employment criteria to be necessary to the
essence of its business operations varies with the business involved.
Since the carrier's business was the safe transportation of people from
one place to another, the company could invoke the criterion of safe
driving ability as the necessary job qualification. 65 Having established
safe driving to be related to the essence of Tamiami's business opera-
tions, the court required the company to establish either that substan-
162. Id
163. 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976).
164. Id at 237-38.
165. Id at 236.
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tially all persons over forty were unable to perform safely and
efficiently the duties of intercity bus drivers, or that it was impractica-
ble to ascertain the safe driving abilities of these drivers on an individ-
ual basis. 166 Applying the "clearly erroneous" standard of appellate
review, the circuit court examined the evidence and upheld the trial
court's decision that individual testing was incapable of revealing the
physiological and psychological changes with sufficient reliability to
meet the carrier's special safety obligations.'
67
Employers seeking to justify their employment policies under the
first prong of the Weeks element would do well to compile statistical
employment profiles correlating data regarding age and job perform-
ance, since a bfoq may be established by a statistical analysis of the
employer's work force or by the use of industry statistics if they can be
shown to be substantially similar. 68 If this is not feasible, then em-
ployers may fall back on the second prong of Weeks. By showing the
impracticability of making individual assessments of job capabilities,
166. Id
167. Id at 238. See also Aaron v. Davis, 414 F. Supp. 453 (E.D. Ark. 1976), holding that
forced retirement of an assistant city fire chief and a district chief upon reaching age 62 was not
supported by proof of a bfoq since the employer failed to show the relevancy of the age retirement
requirement and there was no proof that periodic physical examinations were incapable of de-
tecting degeneration due to age; Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 553 F.2d 561 (8th Cir.
1977), reversing a lower court finding of a bfoq where a supersonic test pilot was mandatorily
retired upon reaching age 52. The Eighth Circuit held that the employer's generalization regard-
ing the safe performance of pilots over 50 years old was insufficient to establish a bfoq where the
pilot proved (1) that the effects of aging on pilots is slower than in the general population; (2) that
as experience increases, the accident rate for pilots decreases with age; and (3) the Air Force, the
Navy, NASA and the FAA do not restrict supersonic pilots in their 50s. Id at 563-64. The pilot
furthermore established that medical technology can predict pilot disabilities with almost fool-
proof accuracy. Id at 564. But see Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975), involving an intercity bus carrier's policy of refusing to
hire applicants over the age of 35 for the position of bus driver. The Seventh Circuit held that
because public safety interests and the standard of care imposed upon common carriers required
them to exercise a high degree of care in the hiring of drivers, the carrier needed only to show a
rational factual basis for its presumption. Under this standard, an employer's presumption re-
garding the effects of age upon health and safety are valid to support a finding that age is a bfoq
where it can be established that such a presumption is predicated upon an objectively arrived at
rational basis in fact.
168. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 805 (1973). See also Phillips v.
Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971), decided under Title VII and involving an employer's
refusal to hire women with pre-school children while hiring fathers of such children. In overrul-
ing summary judgment in favor of the employer, the Court held that the district court should hear
evidence on the issue of whether conflicting family obligations constituted a bfoq. Id at 544. The
Court implied that some statistical demonstration that women with small children are likely to
have greater absenteeism than men might support a different rule for men than women. A concur-
rence by Justice Marshall rejected this possibility, arguing that Title VII requires employers to be
sex-blind except where specific physical characteristics possessed by one sex are necesary for the
job. Id. at 544-47.
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the employer will be permitted to continue its age-based personnel
practice.
It is the second part of the bfoq formula which should be judicially
modified. The courts should require that after an employer establishes
the impracticability of individual assessment, it must additionally show
that its policy is the least discriminatory device for determining job ca-
pability, since it may be possible to substitute another generalization
which will accomplish the employer's objectives without sacrificing all
workers beyond a certain age. 169 This result does not seriously impair
an employer's defenses because he may resort to either the bfoq or
good cause exceptions. If hiring younger workers is a bona fide occu-
pational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of
the employer's business, older workers may be discriminated against.
If the bfoq exception is unavailable due to a lack of empirical evidence
that all, or substantially all, older workers cannot safely and efficiently
perform the necessary job functions, the employer should be required
to hire the older worker but be permitted to discharge for cause if the
employee proves to be ineffective. This approach gives the older
worker a reasonable opportunity to prove he can satisfactorily perform
the job while further permitting an employer to discharge the employee
for cause if the employee fails to satisfy the job requirements.
Reasonable Factors Other Than Age and Good Cause Determina-
tions. Two related exceptions exist where an employment determina-
tion is based on "reasonable factors other than age," or where the
discharge or discipline of an employee can be shown to be for cause. 170
Both exceptions represent two sides of the same coin, since every good
cause discharge or discipline of an employee will constitute an employ-
ment practice based on a reasonable factor other than age. These ex-
ceptions reflect a recognition that discriminatory personnel practices
must be distinguished from legitimate exercises of employer judgment
and control.
These exceptions do not lend themselves to any precise definition
of their scope and application. The administrative interpretations re-
flect a recognition that their scope is difficult to ascertain and that no
precise determination is possible. Both the DOL interpretations and
the EEOC proposed interpretations suggest that determinations be
made on a case by case basis. '7 ' This would seem to make allowances
169. See Harvard Note, supra note 5, at 408 n.181.
170. ADEA § 4, 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(I) (1976).
171. See 29 C.F.R. § 860.103(b), (d) (1979); Proposed Interprettions, supra note 12,
§ 1625.7(b).
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for unusual working conditions. 172 As with the bfoq exception, these
exceptions will be construed narrowly, with defendants bearing the
proof. 173
Although the courts have been no more precise than enforcing
agencies in interpreting the exceptions, the case law does provide some
guidelines to aid the determination. Judicial construction of the excep-
tions suggests that their application be governed by a recognition of
both the dictates of compelling business conditions and the spirit of the
statute. The courts have fashioned a standard that balances an em-
ployer's business judgment against the ADEA's remedial purposes.
Bishop v. Jelleff Associates174 is illustrative of this judicial posture.
In Bishop, a woman's specialty store catering to a clientele of ma-
ture women embarked on a program designed to reduce its personnel.
This was necessitated by poor business conditions and excessive payroll
expenses. By discharging its older employees and expanding its prod-
uct line, the company additionally hoped to appeal to a younger mar-
ket. In terminating one employee, the company gave as its reason the
fact that "business was falling off"; another was terminated after being
advised that "business was slow." Recognizing that the company's de-
cision to change its image and clientele represented a business decision,
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia neverthe-
less held that the employment decision resulted in age discrimination,
which was not in keeping with the ADEA's remedial spirit. 75
The court's holding represents a delicate balancing of an em-
ployer's business judgment and the ADEA's legislative objectives. The
court held "that the statute is not violated in the case of terminations or
other employer decisions which are premised upon a rational business
judgment not activated by age bias."' 76 This good faith business judg-
ment rule represents an appreciation of what constitutes an appropriate
judicial function, and reflects the long-standing tradition of judicial
self-restraint. "To conclude otherwise," wrote Judge Green, "would
make the federal courts a super board of directors reviewing bona fide
management decisions, a procedure Congress clearly did not intend by
passage of this Act."' 177 Thus questions of "whether employee layoffs
were actually required by business conditions, whether reductions in
172. Although the EEOC proposed interpretations are silent on this, the DOL interpretations
explicitly recognized allowances for unusual working conditions. 29 C.F.R. § 860.103(d) (1979).
173. Id § 860.103(e); Proposed Interpretations, supra note 12, § 1625.7(e).
174. 398 F. Supp. 579 (D.D.C. 1974).
175. Id at 594.
176. Id at 593.
177. Id
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personnel contribute to rather than alleviate poor sales, and whether an
executive in conflict with management is an able businessman are not
the kind of judgments the courts are permitted or required to make."17 8
However, the court tempered its recognition of an employer's business
judgment by cautioning that "where business judgment exceeds those
instances set forth above, and reductions are predominantly of older
workers for no apparent, rational reason other than age, . . . the spirit
of the statute has been violated."'' 79
The precise issue presented in Bishop was whether economic rea-
sons may fall under the reasonable factors other than age exception. In
practical terms, the issue is whether an employer may respond to eco-
nomic reversals by firing older workers because of the increased labor
and benefit expenses of employing them, and whether an employer
may hire only young workers to attract a younger clientele. 80 Al-
though both Bishop and the agency interpretations prohibit economic
reasons from serving as reasonable factors other than age,' 8 ' courts
construing a similar exception to the Equal Pay Act have held other-
wise. 182
Where, as in Bishop, an employer uses economic reasons for dis-
criminating against older workers, two factors, age and the economic
justification, underlie the employment decision. The employment deci-
sion is not based just on the factor other than age (the economic rea-
son), but on age as well. Indeed, age is the determining factor. The
fact that an employment decision is also based on some economic bene-
fit does not change the fact that it is based on age. Under Bishop, eco-
nomic reasons may not serve as reasonable factors other than age
where the economic benefit derives from the age discrimination. 83 Ec-
onomic reasons may prompt an employer's business judgment to re-
duce personnel, but any reduction in force should not result in blindly
terminating only older workers. All employees should be individually
evaluated in the process.
In deciding whether an individual personnel determination is
based on a reasonable factor other than age, courts rely heavily upon
whether the employer used ordinary, objective and valid criteria. In
178. 1d
179. ld at 594.
180. Id at 585.
181. 29 C.F.R. § 860.103(h); Proposed Interpretations, supra note 12, § 1625.7(f).
182. See Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905
(1970); Mastie v. Great Lakes Steel Corp., 424 F. Supp. 1299 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
183. 398 F. Supp. at 590.
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Stringfellow v. Monsanto Co. ,184 the discharge of older workers was
held to be based on reasonable factors other than age where the dis-
charge decisions were pursuant to an employee evaluation plan which
utilized eighteen criteria (one of which was productivity, and none of
which was age) derived from publications of the American Manage-
ment Association and other similar recognized sources. Similarly, the
discharge of a 50-year-old chemist was upheld in Gill v. Union Carbide
Corp. 185 because "management, in a careful and intelligent manner,
undertook to establish a system to evaluate the qualifications of each
employee."' 86 Interestingly enough, Union Carbide's evaluation stan-
dards included age and length of service as employment factors; how-
ever, neither was used adversely in evaluating employees, but only
operated to their benefit. Even if age is unlawfully used in making a
preliminary decision to discharge an employee (e.g., by a foreman),
such a discharge has been upheld as valid where the final employee
evaluation was made by someone without knowledge of the employee's
age (e.g., a manager). 187
Although relying upon employer use of employee evaluations,
courts permit the employee to prove such criteria to be mere pretext for
discriminating on the basis of age. Thus in Hodgson v. Ideal Corru-
gated Box Co. ,188 an ADEA violation was found where, among other
things, the employer had asked three foremen to satisfy impossible pro-
duction goals and used their failure as a pretext for dismissing them.
In summary, employers seeking to justify job reductions or other
employment practices on the grounds that such practices were decided
on the basis of reasonable factors other than age would do well to re-
tain any records serving to explain the underlying business justifica-
tions for their employment policies, and furthermore utilize procedures
designed to explain the basis of individual employment decisions. Em-
ployee evaluations may be used if they are based on objective, job-
related criteria, and age is not adversely used in the evaluation.
Bona Fide Seniority Systems. Section 4(f)(2) of the ADEA pro-
vides that it is not unlawful to observe the terms of any bona fide sen-
iority system which is not a subterfuge for evading the purposes of the
Act. 189 To be "bona fide," under the administrative interpretations, a
184. 320 F. Supp. 1175 (W.D. Ark. 1970).
185. 368 F. Supp. 364 (E.D. Tenn. 1973).
186. Id at 367-68.
187. Id
188. 10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 744 (N.D. W. Va. 1974).
189. ADEA § 4(f)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (Supp. III 1979).
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seniority system must use length of service as the primary criterion in
differentiating between the employment opportunities of younger and
older employees, although merit, capacity or ability may also be con-
sidered. 190 Because a normal seniority system gives greater rights or
more favored treatment to those employees with longer service (usually
older employees), a system that gives those workers fewer rights or less
favored treatment is considered to be a subterfuge for circumventing
the Act. 9'
To qualify for the exception under the agency interpretations, the
essential terms and conditions of the seniority system must be commu-
nicated to the affected employees, and the system must be shown to
apply uniformly to all affected employees regardless of age. 192 If a sen-
iority system is applied equally to all workers, that is strong evidence
that the system is bona fide. 193 The seniority system need not be plant-
wide 'to be bona fide--occupational, departmental or company-wide
systems are also acceptable.194
The DOL took the position that a seniority system which had the
effect of perpetuating age discrimination which may have existed
before the ADEA's effective date would not qualify for the excep-
tion.195 The EEOC proposes to delete this from its interpretations,
96
presumably in recognition that the position confficted with Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 197 where the Supreme
Court held that an otherwise valid seniority system was not rendered
invalid merely because it had the effect of "locking in" pre-Act discrim-
ination by the employer. In a seven-to-two decision, the Court stated
that a facially neutral seniority system which perpetuates pre-Act dis-
crimination is invalid only if the seniority system itself had its genesis
in discrimination-that is, if the system itself, although facially neutral,
was intended to discriminate. 19 Teamsters is arguably determinative
of the legality of such seniority systems under the ADEA, because of
the identical nature of the ADEA's seniority exception with the senior-
190. 29 C.F.R. § 860.105(a) (1979); Proposed Interpretations supra note 12, § 1625.8(a).
191. 29 C.F.R. § 860.105(b) (1979); Proposed Interpretations supra note 12, § 1625.8(b).
192. 29 C.F.R. § 860.105(b) (1979); Proposed Interpretations supra note 12, § 1625.8(c).
193. McFadden v. Baltimore S.S. Trade Ass'n, 352 F. Supp. 403 (D. Md.), aft'd, 483 F.2d 452
(4th Cir. 1973) (per curiam); United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 316 F. Supp. 567 (M.D.
Fla. 1970), ajyrd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 451 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 906 (1972) (both cases involved Title VII claims).
194. 29 C.F.R. § 860.105(a) (1979).
195. Id § 860.105(b).
196. See Proposed Interpretations, supra note 12, § 1625.8.
197. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
198. Id at 346 n.28.
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ity provision of Title VII.199
Perhaps because of this similarity between the ADEA and Title
VII, the EEOC's Proposed Interpretations provide that a seniority sys-
tem that classifies workers on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or
national origin in violation of Title VII will not be considered to be
bona fide under the ADEA.2°° This proposed interpretation is sup-
ported by a supplemental statement that it is the EEOC's posture that
its proposed interpretations of the ADEA be construed consistently
with Title VII.201 However, in the area of seniority systems, this use of
Title VII may result in less than maximum protection for the older
worker.
Bona Fide Benefit Plans. Section 4(0(2) also excepts from the
ADEA's coverage age discrimination based on any bona fide employee
benefit plan.20 2 An employer is not required to provide older workers
with the same pension, retirement or insurance benefits that are pro-
vided to younger workers, as long as any differential is in accordance
with a bona fide employee benefit plan. However, an employer is re-
quired to incur the same amount of cost in providing benefits for both
older and younger workers. That such an amount will buy less bene-
fits for an older worker (e.g., insurance) does not in itself violate the
Act. 20 3 Varying benefits under a bona fide benefit plan when such ben-
efits are determined by a formula involving age and length of service
requirements is also permitted under the Act. 2°4 The purpose of this
exception is to remove the disincentive for hiring older employees that
is associated with the higher costs of providing benefits to older work-
ers.
Before the 1978 amendments, much of the litigation involving this
exception concerned whether the provision authorized the involuntary
retirement of workers within the protected age categories where the re-
tirement was pursuant to the terms of a retirement or pension plan. 20 5
The Department of Labor had interpreted the exception as authorizing
199. Title VII § 703(h), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976) provides:
[Ilt shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different
standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment
pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system . . . provided that such differences are
not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.
200. Proposed Interpretations, supra note 12, § 1625.8(d).
201. Id
202. ADEA § 4(f)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(2) (Supp. III 1979).
203. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(a) (1979). See also Employee Benefit Plans: Amendment to Inter-
pretive Bulletin, 44 Fed. Reg. 30,649, 30,658 (1979).
204. Id
205. See, e.g., United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192 (1977); Zinger v. Blanchette,
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such mandatory retirement so long as the plan's sole purpose was not
just to move out older workers. 2°6 A principal change made by the
1978 amendments was the inclusion of explicit language making clear
that the Act prohibits involuntary retirement because of age of any em-
ployee within the protected age group, even though pursuant to a bona
fide employee benefit plan.20 7
A SURVEY OF TYPICAL BUSINESS PRACTICES IN TENSION
WITH THE ADEA
The following discussion analyzes the legality of several common
personnel practices affected by the ADEA. A functional or life-cycle
approach is undertaken. Thus, the discussion focuses upon pre-em-
ployment and post-hiring practices.
Pre-employment Protection: Help Wanted Advertisements and
Recruitment Restrictions
Pre-employment protection takes the form of prohibitions against
discriminatory advertising, recruitment practices and interviewing
techniques.
Help- Wanted Advertisements. It is unlawful under section 4(e) to
indicate any preference, limitation, specification or discrimination
based on age in any employment notice or advertisement. 20 8 The
greatest amount of litigation in this area has been over the use of cer-
tain terms and phrases in help-wanted advertising. 20 9
549 F.2d 901 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1008 (1978); Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Co.,
500 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1974).
206. 29 C.F.R. § 860.110(a) (1979).
207. The exception originally read, in part, as follows:
(f) It shall not be unlawful for an employer, employment agency or labor organiza-
tion-
(2) to observe the terms of. . . any bona fide employee benefit plan such as a
retirement, pension, or insurance plan, which is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of
this chapter, except that no such employee benefit plan shall excuse the failure to hire
any individual ...
29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1976).
As a result of the 1978 amendments, the following final clause was added to the original
provision:
[AInd no such. . . employee benefit plan shall require or permit the involuntary retire-
ment of any individual specified. . . because of the age of such individual.
29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (Supp. III 1979).
208. See ADEA § 4(e), 29 U.S.C. § 623(e) (1976).
209. Although most advertisements will be printed, and section 4(e) only refers to any adver-
tisement printed or published, word-of-mouth advertising has been held unlawful in several Title
VII cases. Although such advertising is neutral on its face, it can perpetuate past discrimination,
because such ads normally do not reach those groups discriminated against. See, e.g., United
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The administrative interpretations construe section 4(e) as prohib-
iting such terms and phrases as "young," "boy," "girl,". "college stu-
dent," "recent college graduate," "age 25 and 35," "age 40 to 50" and
"age over 50 to 65. ' '210 Phrases such as "retired person" or "supple-
ment your pension"9 are prohibited when used to discriminate against
others within the protected group. 21' The phrase "state age" is not in
itself a violation of the Act, but it will be "closely scrutinized" in order
to ascertain whether the request is for a valid purpose.212 Educational
requirements such as "college graduate" or specifications for a mini-
mum age less than 40 are not prohibited,21 3 and an individual seeking
employment through advertising may specify his own age.21 4 Several
courts have followed these interpretations and have found the use of
such language to violate the ADEA. 215
One district court, in Brennan v. Paragon Employment Agency,
Inc. ,216 however, has explicitly refused to follow these interpretations,
calling them "wholly lacking in rea sonableness. '' 217 The United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York found such ads
seeking "college students," "girls," "boys," and "June graduates" ''en-
couraged young persons. . . to turn from idleness to useful endeavor,"
and were based on "reasonable factors other than age."'218
States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973) (race); EEOC Decision No. 73-0463, 16
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1792 (1973) (sex).
Even though a newspaper advertisement is clearly discriminatory, the newspaper cannot be
prohibited from including the ad. Such a prohibition has been deemed protected as commercial
speech by the first amendment, and relief must be sought from the party placing the ad. Pitts-
burgh Press Co. v. Commonwealth, 14 Empl. Prac. Dec. 1 7744 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1977).
210. 29 C.F.R. § 860.92(b) (1979); Proposed Interpretations, supra note 12, § 1625.4(a).
211. Id
212. Id § 860.92(d); Proposed Interpretations, supra note 12, § 1625.4(b).
213. Id § 860.92(c).
214. Id § 860.92(e).
215. See, e.g., Brennan v. C/M Mobile Inc., 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. 9532 (S.D. Ala. 1974)
("young man," "new grad" and "college student" held to be violative of the Act); Brennan v.
Hughes Personnel Inc., 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. 9571 (W.D. Ky. 1974) ("girl," "recent college gradu-
ate," and requiring applicants to be between 28 and 35 are violative); Hodgson v. Career Counsel-
lors Int'l Inc., 5 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 129 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (preference for a "girl" is
discriminatory). See also Hodgson v. Western Textile Co., 7 Empl. Prac. Dec. 9383 (N.D. Ill.
1974).
These courts awarded injunctive relief. The Hughes Personnel court also awarded damages
to the job applicants in the amount of the employment agency's potential profit resulting from job
placements through the improper advertisement. The Western Textile Co. court held the Secre-
tary of Labor entitled to a compensatory fine to reimburse him for costs and expenses in investi-
gating the defendant's operations and in prosecuting the civil contempt action (for violation of a
prior restraining order and injunction).
216. 356 F. Supp. 286 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), afdmem., 489 F.2d 752 (2d Cir. 1974).
217. Id at 289.
218. Id It should be noted that the court's pronouncements in Paragon Employment regard-
ing the use of such phrases are dicta since the plaintiffs complaint failed to allege that the defend-
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Still another court has attempted to strike a middle ground be-
tween these two lines of cases. In Hodgson v. Approved Personnel Serv-
ice, Inc. ,219 the Fourth Circuit held that the discriminatory effect of an
advertisement is determined not by the use of certain "trigger words,"
but by the context in which the words are used. The court gave the
example of the phrase "recent grads": when used to appeal to broad
categories of individuals in an informative manner, as to available
services, this phrase would not be violative of the Act, but such lan-
guage could not be used in relation to a specific job.220
Thus, advertisements should be carefully worded so as not to ex-
clude potential job applicants in the protected age group. Phrases such
as "young" "boy" or "girl" and "recent college graduate" are likely to
be found violative of the Act. However, statements of educational re-
quirements and those such as "not under 18" are not prohibited, 221 and
one court has found the phrases "junior executive," "first job," "to
work with young office group," "athletically inclined" and "All-Ameri-
can type" not to be violative since they do not indicate an age prefer-
ence. 222 An advertisement may use the language "state age," but it will
be closely scrutinized to ascertain the purpose of such a phrase. 223 To
be clearly within the law, advertisements should avoid any language
that could be construed as indicating, directly or indirectly, preferences,
limitations or specifications based on age. Including the following lan-
guage may help to show the lack of discriminatory preference: "The
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 prohibits discrimina-
tion on the basis of age with respect to individuals who are at least 40
but less than 70 years of age. '224
ant-employer met the requirements of an "employer" under the ADEA set out in 29 U.S.C. §
630(b); this caused the complaint to be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
219. 529 F.2d 760 (4th Cir. 1975).
220. Id at 765-66. See also Hodgson v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 455 F.2d 818 (5th Cir.
1972), which refused to hold an advertisement for a "young man" was itself a violation of the Act.
221. 29 C.F.R. § 860.92(c) (1979).
222. Hodgson v. Approved Personnel Serv., Inc., 529 F.2d 760, 766-67 (4th Cir. 1975).
223. 29 C.F.R. § 860.92(d) (1979); Proposed Interpretations, supra note 12, § 1625.4(b).
224. W. CONNOLLY, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 46 (1975).
Such a suggestion follows from a DOL regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 860.95(a) (1979), concerning
job applications, which suggests including this language on a job application which requires the
applicant to state his age, in order to inform the applicant such information will not be used for a
discriminatory purpose.
It should be noted however, that in a Title VII case, Hailes v. United Air Lines, Inc., 464 F.2d
1006 (5th Cir. 1972), the court held that inclusion of the phrase "United is an Equal Opportunity
Employer" would not neutralize the discriminatory effect of an advertisement for a stewardess
placed in the "help wanted female" column of a newspaper without a corresponding ad in the
"help wanted male" column. Thus, it is not unreasonable to believe that a court will closely
scrutinize language such as "state age" to ascertain if a discriminatory preference is present even
though a self-imposed anti-discriminatory phrase is included in the ad.
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Recruitment Restrictions. Recruitment of employees may be un-
dertaken by contacting employment agencies and educational institu-
tions. The following paragraphs focus on the legality of placing age-
biased orders with employment agencies and an employer's limiting
recruitment to certain educational institutions. This discussion also ex-
amines the situation where an employer seeks to justify hiring younger
workers because of customer preference.
(1) Biased Orders to Employment Agencies. Section 4(b) of
the ADEA prohibits an employment agency from failing or refusing to
refer for employment, or from classifying or referring for employment,
any individual on the basis of age.225 An employment agency is subject
to this prohibition even when acting under the direction of a noncov-
ered employer. 226
One case has been decided based on this provision of the Act con-
cerning biased orders to employment agencies. In Brennan v. Hughes
Personnel, Inc. ,227 an employer had placed with the defendant employ-
ment agency a job order specifying that applicants were required to be
between the ages of 28 and 35. The employment agency then placed
advertisements for such employees in a newspaper, 228 and eventually
refused to refer three applicants to the employer because of their age.
The court held that the employment agency had violated section 4(b) of
the act and awarded the applicants' damages, measured by the agency's
potential profit resulting from job placements achieved by the improper
advertisements.
An employer placing a biased order with an employment agency
may also be found to have violated the Act. In Hodgson v. First Federal
Savings & Loan Association ,229 the defendant had a job order on file
with an employment agency that specified females within the age limits
of 21 to 24. The court found this to be evidence of the defendant's
discriminatory policy.230
No section of the ADEA specifically covers this practice by an em-
ployer. Section 4(e) of the Act prohibits an employer from printing or
publishing (or causing to be printed or published) any notice or adver-
225. ADEA § 4(b), 29 U.S.C. § 623(b) (1976).
226. 29 C.F.R. § 860.36(b) (1979); Proposed Interpretations, supra note 12, § 1625.3(a).
227. 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. $ 9571 (W.D. Ky. 1974).
228. Such a practice, therefore, is also a violation of § 4(e) of the Act. See notes 208-24 supra
and accompanying text.
229. 455 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1972).
230. Id at 823. Note, however, that this particular practice was not involved in the discrimi-
natory act of which plaintiff complained, but was merely used as evidence of defendant's policy of
age discrimination.
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tisement relating to employment indicating any preference, limitation,
specification or discrimination based on age.23 1 Thus, under a strict,
literal reading, the Act would not prohibit an employer from placing a
job order discriminating against older workers if such an order were
not printed or published in a notice or advertisement. 232 Indeed, the
court in Brennan v. Hughes Personnel233 held that an employment
agency's files may contain age characteristics about the applicants with-
out violating the ADEA (even though the same information, if pub-
lished, would violate the Act), which seems to support the position that
an employer may specify an age limit to an employment agency as long
as such a restriction is not published. However, the court was referring
to age information collected for permissible purposes, and not used to
"classify" or "refer" applicants. 234 In addition, the court in IHodgson v.
First Federal Savings and Loan Association hinted that an employment
agency maintaining age preferences in job orders would violate the
Act.23
5
It would seem that the use of age limits in job orders, even if not
published in an advertisement or notice, violates the intent of Congress
in passing the ADEA,236 since the employer is still basing its hiring
decisions on the applicant's age, which is prohibited by other sections
of the Act. 237 It is suggested that in order to fulfill the purposes of the
Act, the same criteria be used in evaluating job orders to employment
agencies as are used in evaluating advertisements. Employers should
avoid wording which would violate the advertising prohibitions in writ-
ing job orders, and employment agencies should refrain from request-
ing age preferences on job orders and from accepting job orders with
questionable wording.
(2) Recruitment Limited to Certain Institutions. Employer
recruitment of new employees at colleges, universities and technical
schools, where the great proportion of students are younger than the
protected age group, is commonplace, and it is not unusual for compa-
nies to hire their greatest number of new employees from such institu-
tions. Only one case under the ADEA deals with such a practice. In
231. See notes 208-24 and accompanying text supra.
232. It could, however, be argued that a job order is a "notice."
233. 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. 9571 (W.D. Ky. 1974).
234. Help wanted notices and advertisements, and job applications may require an applicant
to state his age as long as the information is for a permissible purpose. Such a request will be
"closely scrutinized" to determine its purpose. See 29 C.F.R. § 860.92 (1979).
235. 455 F.2d 818, 822 n.ll (5th Cir. 1972).
236. See ADEA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1976).
237. See id § 4(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1976).
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Mistretta v. Sandia Corp. ,238 the court held that an employer which
concentrated on college recruiting for its new employees and did not
actively recruit those in the protected age group did not violate the Act.
The court found nothing inherently suspicious about campus recruit-
ing, since the labor market would be expected to consist of recent grad-
uates looking for jobs rather than from the older population which
would tend to be already established. In addition, the court refused to
infer discrimination from the fact that ninety percent of the company's
new employees were younger than the protected age group, since that
was not significantly different from what was to be generally expected
in the marketplace. Finally, the court noted that there was no evidence
to show whether older applicants were less successful than applicants in
general in obtaining employment with the defendant.
The result in this case is different from Title VII cases dealing with
this issue. In United States v. Georgia Power Co. ,239 for example, the
court held that recruiting only at particular scholastic institutions (as
well as word-of-mouth hiring), although neutral on its face, operated as
a "built-in-headwind" to blacks, unjustified by business necessity. Al-
though the employer company was not enjoined from recruiting on all
college campuses, it was not allowed to continue to recruit from all-
white institutions while maintaining a racially imbalanced work force,
and was required to supplement college recruitment with affirmative
steps to employ blacks.
The ADEA and Title VII cases can be distinguished. It is not un-
reasonable for employers to recruit on college campuses, especially if
they are in need of people with technical skills, where the pool of appli-
cants is likely to be large, well-trained and in one place. Such a recruit-
ment practice might indeed be the only way in which an employer
could carry on large scale interviewing.2 40 In addition, the Mistretta v.
Sandia Corp. court found no evidence of past or present discrimination
against older workers, 24' while in the Title VII cases, employers had a
past history of racial discrimination.
However, other courts might be more willing to infer discrimina-
tion from a high percentage of young new employees or an imbalanced
work force and follow the Title VII cases in requiring employers to
238. 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1690 (D.N.M. 1977).
239. 474 F.2d 906, 925 (5th Cir. 1973).
240. Contrast the lack of business necessity in interviewing at only all-white schools. See id
Although there is no business necessity exception in the ADEA, practical considerations may be
used to justify a practice and rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case. See Hodgson v. First Fed. Sav.
& Loan Ass'n, 455 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1972).
241. 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1690, 1696 (D.N.M. 1977).
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take additional active measures in order to recruit older, protected
workers. Following the suggestion of the court in Georgia Power Co.,
employers should widely advertise openings in newspapers and period-
icals and give public notice that they are an equal opportunity em-
ployer.242 Notices in professional journals would especially be likely to
reach older, trained employees interested in a new job. And of course,
employers must be careful not to discriminate in the actual hiring of
employees once an initial recruitment contact has been made. Employ-
ers must be able to show that older workers have the same chance as
younger workers in finding out about and obtaining employment. In
such ways, employers may be able to avoid charges of discrimination in
recruitment and hiring.
(3) Hiring Younger Workers Because of Customer Prefer-
ence. No case has been decided dealing directly with the refusal to hire
older'workers because of customer preference. However, such a refusal
would certainly violate Congress' intent to "promote employment of
older persons based on their ability rather than age."' 243 To allow such
a practice perpetuates the stereotypes of older workers which the
ADEA was meant to remedy.
There are ADEA cases that deal with the firing of older workers in
order to project a youthful image. In Bishop v. JellefAssociates,244 the
court recognized that the employer's decision to change its image and
clientele was a business decision but held that firing older workers
merely because they were older violated the ADEA. In Schulz v. Hick-
ock Manufacturing Co. ,245 the employer tried to reverse its financial
losses by advancing a "youth movement," but again, the court held that
firing older workers simply because they were older was impermissi-
ble.246 The refusal to hire older workers simply because of age is indis-
tinguishable from the firing situation.
The situation has been directly dealt with under Title VII. EEOC
interpretations will not allow the bfoq exception to be applied to a situ-
ation where the refusal to hire a person is because of co-worker, em-
ployer, client or customer preference. 247 The hiring of only women as
airline flight attendants on the grounds of customer preference was re-
242. 474 F.2d at 926.
243. ADEA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1976).
244. 398 F. Supp. 579 (D.D.C. 1974).
245. 358 F. Supp. 1208 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
246. However, it has been held that if there are valid grounds for discharging an employee, the
fact that the employer also felt a younger employee would enhance the business' image is not a
violation of the ADEA. See, Brennan v. Reynolds & Co., 367 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. I11. 1973).
247. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(l)(iii) (1979).
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jected in Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. 248 One EEOC de-
cision 249 has held the hiring of only female nurses in a nursing home
where seventy-five percent of the patients were women to violate Title
VII even though the female patients preferred female nurses. The
Commission indicated that ability to perform the job and not customer
preference should control the hiring decision.
Even though a business directed at a youthful market must hire an
older applicant if he or she is best qualified for the job, if the employee
proves to be ineffective (using a standard applied to all of the business'
employees), he or she may be fired even if the ineffectiveness is due at
least in part to the person's age. 250 Unsatisfactory job performance
based on fairly applied standards qualifies for the "good cause" excep-
tion to the ADEA.25 l Thus, while older workers must be given an op-
portunity to prove themselves on the job, an employer will not be
required to retain a worker who is unable to effectively do the job.
Interviewing Techniques. Job interviews continue to play an im-
portant role in the hiring process. Although they are often initially
conducted by a personnel officer, it is not uncommon for prospective
employees to be interviewed by potential supervisors and co-workers in
subsequent interviews. Thus, it is likely that people who are untrained
in personnel and legal matters may become involved through the inter-
view process in decisions affected by the ADEA. What follows is a
discussion of the more commonly expressed concerns of those who are
involved in this part of the hiring process.
(1) Asking Prospect's Age. Both the DOL interpretations
and the EEOC proposed interpretations take the position that an em-
ployer may request a job applicant to state his age or date of birth.252
Such a request is not a per se violation of the ADEA, but because it
may deter older persons from applying, it will be closely scrutinized to
assure it is done for a permissible purpose.253 To inform applicants
that the purpose of the request for their age is not discriminatory, the
administrative interpretations suggest that the following language ac-
company the request: "The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
248. 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
249. EEOC Decision No. 72-0697, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 444 (1971).
250. Id The EEOC noted that Title VII would not be violated if it could be shown that all
patients (male and female) were prejudiced against male nurses, and that such prejudice made it
impossible for the male nurses to perform essential duties.
251. See notes 170-88 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of reasonable factors
other than age and discharge for cause.
252. 29 C.F.R. § 860.95(a) (1979); Proposed Interpretations, supra note 12, § 1625.5.
253. Id
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1967 prohibits discrimination on the basis of age with respect to indi-
viduals who are at least 40 but less than 70 years of age."' 254 Though
not required, such a notice will be evidence in the employer's favor if a
request for age is ever questioned. It should be noted that a person
advertising for employment may volunteer his age.2 5 5 Similarly, an
employee should be allowed to volunteer his age on an application or
in an interview.
It is not unreasonable to allow employers to ask an applicant's age.
Unlike references to race, which generally must be deleted, 256 the age
of an applicant is difficult to conceal. Information as to previous work
experience indicates at least the applicant's approximate age, and the
employer must know the age of his employees for purposes of various
benefit plans, such as insurance and pensions. At the same time, the
administrative interpretations provide some protection for the appli-
cant against discrimination by requiring that such information be used
only for permissible purposes. The precise meaning of "closely scruti-
nized" has yet to be delineated.
(2) Questionnaire and Testing Requirements. Reliance upon
ability tests to distinguish the qualified from the unqualified applicants
is common. Indeed, an entire industry has developed around the use of
standardized tests for employment as well as educational purposes.
When an applicant fails to qualify for a job because of the applicant's
inability to pass the prospective employer's test, the possibility exists
for the employer to justify its refusal to hire on the ground that the
decision was based on a factor other than age.257
However, both the DOL interpretations and the EEOC proposals
adopt the approach that has been judicially developed in dealing with
the discriminatory use of tests under Title VII.258 Under this approach,
where an outwardly objective employment criterion, e.g., a test, never-
theless has an adverse impact upon persons in the protected group, the
criterion must be shown to be related to the essential job require-
ments.259 Under Title VII, this requirement that such tests be job-re-
254. Id
255. 29 C.F.R. 860.92(e) (1979).
256. However, the EEOC interprets Title VII to allow inquiries as to race, color, religion or
national origin in connection with the administration of fair employment practices programs.
Such inquiries must conform with the directives of the various governmental agencies involved.
Otherwise such inquiries are viewed with "extreme disfavor" since race, color, religion and na-
tional origin frequently bear no relationship to ability or qualifications. EEOC, Pre-Hire Inquiries
(January 13, 1966 as amended May 27, 1968).
257. See notes 170-88 supra and accompanying text.
258. 29 C.F.R. § 860.103(0 (1979); Proposed Interpretations, supra note 12, § 1625.7(d).
259. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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lated translates into a requirement that the tests be validated.
Under the administrative interpretations of the ADEA, an em-
ployer may use unvalidated physical or mental examinations so long as
they do not adversely impact upon older workers. However, where the
use of such tests results in a disproportionate number of failures in the
40 to 70 age group, job validation will be required.260 Employers
should be cautioned about the likelihood their tests will have an ad-
verse impact upon older applicants. The administrative interpretations
point out that the recent increase in the use of tests in primary and
secondary schools has given birth to a generation of test-wise appli-
cants who may have an advantage over their older counterparts who,
despite considerable job experience, may not perform as well on tests
because as a result of their age they are further removed from their
schooling. 261
(3) Writing on an Application. An employer who writes re-
marks on an application during or after an interview may, if not care-
ful, violate the ADEA. In Hodgson v. First Federal Savings & Loan
Association,262 an interviewer had written "too old" on his notes at the
end of the interview. Disbelieving the interviewer's explanation that
the note really meant "too heavy" (another application had the nota-
tion "heavy girl-may make teller"), the court held the defendant had
not met its burden of justifying its refusal to hire plaintiff after the
plaintiff had made out a prima facie case. In Brennan v. Ace Hardware
Corp. ,263 the interviewer had written "Age?" on one application of an
applicant older than 50, and "too old" on another. The court found
this to be a violation of the Act.264
However, writing on applications is still recommended. It has
been suggested that an interviewer should keep a written record of an
interview, detailed enough to support a valid reason for possible rejec-
tion of the applicant. 265 Employers should use a form which lists job-
related factors such as past responsibilities or reasons for leaving past
employment, which provides greater uniformity and lessens the chance
of discriminatory treatment.266 Thus, validly made employment deci-
sions may be substantiated if challenged. 267
260. 29 C.F.R. § 860.103(0 (1979); Proposed Interpretations, supra note 12, § 1625.7(d).
261. Id
262. 455 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1972).
263. 495 F.2d 368 (8th Cir. 1974).
264. The plaintiff lost the case, however, on a procedural issue.
265. R. PERES, DEALING WITH EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 161 (1978).
266. Id
267. A Title VII case, United States v. Bricklayers Local No. 1, 5 Empl. Prac. Dec. 8480
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Post-hiring Practices
The ADEA's protections remain after an applicant has been hired.
Employers need to be cognizant of the consequences of certain post-
hiring practices under the Act. The following discussion focuses on:
post-hiring inquiries by an employer, decisions relating to apprentice-
ship and training programs, work assignments, promotion/demotion
decisions, and compensation and benefit plans.
Post-hiring Inquiries. While an employer will normally have a rec-
ord of an employee's age at the time the employee starts work, a situa-
tion may arise where a post-hiring inquiry is necessary-for example,
to gather data in defense of an age discrimination suit. Such post-hir-
ing inquiries should be governed by the same principles that apply to
age inquiries prior to hiring. 268 Here also, notice of the ADEA's pro-
tection should be given to workers at the time of the inquiry to avoid
any detrimental effect.
In applying Title VII, the EEOC recognizes that data on the race,
sex or national origin of employees can be useful or even necessary
(e.g., for reporting purposes or to permit evaluation of personnel pro-
grams). The Commission recommends that such data be kept as a run-
ning total rather than individually, if feasible, and that such data be
kept separate from other employment data.269 This approach may not
be feasible in situations affected by the ADEA; for while employee
benefits are granted without regard for race, sex or national origin, they
are often properly based on age. Therefore, the separate running total
concept cannot be readily used.
Apprenticeship and Training Programs. In promulgating interpre-
tations for the implementation of the Act, the Department of Labor
had taken the position that apprenticeship programs are not affected by
the ADEA, since participation in such programs has traditionally been
limited to young people as an extension of the educational process. 270
However, two Wage and Hour Opinion Letters contrasted sharply with
this view.271 In one such letter, the Department of Labor held that the
(W.D. Tenn. 1973), affd as modied, sub nom United States v. Masonry Contr. Ass'n, 497 F.2d
871 (6th Cir. 1974), indicated that records of each interview should be kept indicating factors
considered and conclusions about those factors. Permissible factors include motivation, ambition,
interest in trade, willingness to accept directions, and attitude toward instruction.
268. See notes 252-56 and accompanying text supra.
269. EEOC General Counsel Opinion Letter, October 12, 1966.
270. 29 C.F.R. § 860.106 (1979).
271. See Gillan, The Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act Revisited, 9 CLEARING-
HOUSE REV. 761, 768 (1976), which argues that the interpretation is an erroneous interpretation of
the ADEA.
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Act did not protect a 33-year-old worker who was denied entry into an
apprenticeship program not because the ADEA does not apply to ap-
prenticeship programs, but because a 33-year-old is outside the unpro-
tected group.272 A second Opinion Letter held that even indirect
restraints on entry into training programs because of age are prohib-
ited. 273 The proposed EEOC interpretations are silent on the sub-
ject.274
There is also some question as to whether apprenticeship and
training programs may not be covered by the Act because they fall
under the reasonable factor other than age exemption. There may be
little or no chance of recouping the expense of training an older em-
ployee, especially if such worker is due for retirement within a short
time. Requiring an employer to admit older persons to apprenticeship
and training programs when there is a high probability the costs will
not be recovered is unfair to the employer and a waste of resources. On
the other hand, the probability that an employer will not be able to
recoup expenses may often be difficult to calculate (e.g., if an employee
is 40 years old as opposed to 69); any time a worker is trained, there is a
chance the costs will not be recovered (e.g., if the worker were to quit,
become disabled or die); and there is a danger that such a defense
could be used as a pretext. Despite these arguments, courts following
Mastie v. Great Lakes Steel Corp. 275 would find that higher costs of
employing older workers would constitute "reasonable factors other
than age" as long as consideration of employment costs was made on
an individual basis as opposed to a general assessment. Such a solution
seems to be a reasonable approach to the issue and would protect those
older workers still able and willing to provide their employers with
years of service.
Employment decisions related to training may be found to be a
violation of the ADEA. In Coates v. National Cash Register Co. ,276 it
was held that a decision to discharge an employee was based on lack of
training, but that since training was directly related to age, the plaintiff
was indirectly discharged because of age. Thus, a lack of training can-
not form the basis of an employment decision when that deficiency is
created by age discrimination. The plaintifi's remedy included an ac-
celerated training schedule.
272. Wage and Hour Opinion Letter (June 4, 1970).
273. Wage and Hour Opinion Letter (March 13, 1970).
274. See Proposed Interpretations, supra note 12.
275. 424 F. Supp. 1299 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
276. 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 222 (W.D. Va. 1977).
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It should be noted that age limits on entry into apprenticeship pro-
grams have been found to be unlawful under Title VII, where they
perpetuate the effects of past racial discrimination and have no business
justification or necessity. 277
Work Assignments and Job Classifications. Section 4(a)(2) of the
ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer to "limit, segregate, or clas-
sify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely af-
fect his status as an employee, because of such individual's age."' 278 Be-
cause of such broad language, the prudent employer should avoid any
job classification which even hints of age discrimination, unless sure an
exception applies. Each job classification should be analyzed, as to
what skills and abilities are required, and then each employee should
be evaluated individually as to whether his or her capabilities meet that
particular job's requirement. Stereotypes based on age should be
avoided. In Morelock v. NCR Corp. ,279 for example, a facially neutral
seniority system that created a senior and a junior classification was
held to be bona fide under the ADEA, because the classifications were
based on skill and ability and not age. In addition, the motive for cre-
ating the two classifications was economic, the senior and junior labels
connoted job responsibilities and not age, and employees both over and
under 40 were in each classification at all times.280
An employer may lawfully favor an older employee by excusing
him or her from more strenuous job assignments, since the Act speaks
of adverse effects on employment status because of age. In accommo-
dating older employees, however, an employer must not discriminate
against other workers in the protected group.28' For example, a con-
tract assigning a particular type of work to steamfitters over 50 years of
age was found to violate the ADEA, even though its purpose was to
guarantee work for older workers who had difficulty finding jobs, be-
cause the plan would tend to deprive steamfitters ages 40 to 49 of em-
277. See James v. Stockhan Valves and Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977), which held
that the company's investment in a lengthy apprenticeship training program was not a business
necessity that would constitute a valid defense.
278. ADEA § 4(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (1976). Similar restrictions are imposed on em-
ployment agencies, 29 U.S.C. § 623(b), and labor organizations, 29 U.S.C. § 623(c).
279. 586 F.2d 1096 (6th Cir. 1978).
280. A Title VII case, Taylor v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 5 Empl. Prac. Dec. 8545
(N.D. Ala. 1972), also stressed the need to adequately analyze each job and then each female
employee's capabilities in order to see if any of the female workers could perform the jobs classi-
fied as "heavy" (as opposed to "light").
281. 29 C.F.R. § 860.91 (1979); Proposed Interpretations, supra note 12, § 1625.2(a).
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ployment opportunities. 282
Furthermore, an employer may not assign a job to an older worker
that he or she is clearly unable to perform and then discharge the em-
ployee for failure to perform his duties.28 3 It would also appear, that by
analogy to an EEOC decision concerning race, job classification based
on employee preference to work with others of the same age would not
be allowed.284
Promotion and Demotion Decisions. The broad language of sec-
tion 4(a) 285 prohibits employers286 from considering an employee's age
in promotion, demotion and upgrading decisions. The Department of
Labor had interpreted the phrase "terms, conditions or privileges of
employment" found in section 4(a)(1) to include advancement, promo-
tion and demotion.287 However, the EEOC's proposed interpretations
have deleted this interpretation.
In several cases, plaintiffs have been successful in attacking their
demotion or failure to receive a promotion because of age discrimina-
tion. In Marshall v. Board of Education,288 for example, the application
of plaintiff, a guidance counselor, for the position of principal was not
considered because of the fact he had only one year left before
mandatory retirement. The ADEA was held to be violated, and the
plaintiff was awarded back pay at the principal's salary for the entire
year, as well as adjusted pension payments and pre-judgment interest
on the back-pay award. An injunction was also issued against the use
of age or remaining years of service289 in his evaluation.
The court in Polstorif v. F/etcher290 held that NASA had violated
the Act when the plaintiff proved that despite his education, training
and experience to fill several positions opened during a reorganization
282. See Wage and Hour Opinion Letter (May 1, 1970).
283. See note 188 supra and accompanying text.
284. In EEOC Decision No. 72-1684, 5 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 962 (1972), it was held no de-
fense to a Title VII suit charging segregation that black employees preferred to work with other
black employees, and had actually voted to maintain segregation. Another Title VII case, Weeks
v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969) disallowed the defense that state law
required job classification by sex. Similarly, any state statutes requiring jobs to be classified by
age would not be a defense under the ADEA.
285. ADEA § 4(a), 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1976).
286. Id § 4(c), 29 U.S.C. § 623(c) (1976) (prohibits labor organizations from engaging in simi-
lar activities).
287. 29 C.F.R. § 860.50(c) (1979).
288. 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 368 (D. Utah 1977).
289. Id at 373. Since nearly every promotion involves an expense for an employer, e.g., in
training the employee for his or her new job, employers are naturally reluctant to promote an
older employee when it is doubtful the expense will be recouped due to the employee's impending
retirement. See note 275 supra and accompanying text.
290. 452 F. Supp. 17 (N.D. Ala. 1978).
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(during which plaintiff's job had been downgraded), he was not al-
lowed to fill them because of his age. It was also found that, in viola-
tion of the ADEA, younger employees could have job descriptions
rewritten as protection against termination and downgrading. In order
to help prove his case, plaintiff used statistics which compared the per-
centages of workers over and under age 55 affected by reductions,
downgrading and separations. At least one other plaintiff successfully
used statistics to cause a reasonable suspicion that age was a factor in
promotion, showing that while the mean age of non-supervisory em-
ployees had increased over the past ten years, the mean age of those
promoted to supervisory positions had decreased. 291
In McCrikard v. Acme Visible Records, Inc. ,292 the plaintiff was
able to show an ADEA violation after she was demoted and certain of
her responsibilities were reassigned to a younger employee who later
received a larger salary than she had received. However, the plaintiff
lost the case on a procedural issue. 293
Not all courts, however, have found age discrimination where an
older employee has been demoted or passed over for promotion. In
Magruder v. Selling Areas Marketing,294 the court emphasized the
plaintiff's failure to prove that age had been a determining factor in her
demotion after she had received repeated warnings of her unacceptable
job performance and inability to improve. The court pointed out that
the decision to demote could validly be based on individual assess-
ments of "abilities, capabilities, or potential." Other courts have held
that either the plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case that age
was a factor in the employer's action,295 or that the employer had met
its burden of showing its actions were not motivated by age. 296
291. Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1690 (D.N.M. 1977). Cf Lindsey v.
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 546 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1977), in which plaintiffs statistics were held
insufficient to demonstrate age discrimination individually and generally since plaintiff never
proved he was qualified for the job, nor that he had been informed in any way that age was a
factor in promotion or that he had not been promoted because of his age.
292. 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 822 (W.D. Va. 1976).
293. See also Gray v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 77 (D.N.H.
1977) (plaintiff failed to meet the Act's filing requirements and unsuccessfully argued his posi-
tion's downgrading and the effects of his transfer were continuing violations).
294. 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1506 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
295. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 546 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1977); LaRue v.
General Tel. Co., 545 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1977).
296. See, e.g., Toussaint v. Ford Motor Co., 581 F.2d 812 (10th Cir. 1978) (employer's elimi-
nation of plaintiffs position and offer of a lower position motivated by "economic realities of the
time"); Blizard v. Fielding, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 146 (D. Mass. 1977), ree'don other groundr,
572 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1978) (held plaintiffs failure to be promoted was based on employer's views
on department organization and employee's interview and work assignment performance, not age
or sex, even though plaintiff was the only person to pass a competitive examination for the posi-
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Thus, in order to avoid age discrimination charges arising out of
promotion, demotion and upgrading decisions, employers should base
these decisions on an individual assessment of an employee's abilities
and skills and of each job's requirements, not on stereotypes or subjec-
tive non-job related criteria.297
Compensation Rates. Whether a practice of paying lower wages to
older workers is allowed depends on whether the differential is based
on a reasonable factor other than age.298 Some employers may wish to
base pay rates simply upon productivity. The DOL took the position
that factors such as the quantity or quality of production were reason-
able factors other than age if there was a valid relationship to the job
requirements and the same criteria were applied to all employees re-
gardless of age.29 9 This interpretation has been deleted in the EEOC's
proposed interpretations. Although the status of productivity-based
pay rates is less certain as a result of the EEOC's proposals, such a
practice should continue to qualify for the exception.
With regard to compensation and benefits in general, employers
should not rely on informal, unwritten policies. While an informal
plan is valid if it nevertheless is an established plan and its terms have
been communicated to all affected employees, proof of this is difficult
for informal plans. Therefore, a compensation and benefits plan
should be written and distributed.
CONCLUSION: FEDERAL AGE DISCRIMINATION LAW-
A QUESTIONABLE CIVIL RIGHT
Fourteen years ago Congress sought to alleviate the plight of older
workers with the passage of the ADEA. Eleven years later, Congress
sought to strengthen this commitment by extending the upper age limit
five years and disqualifying involuntary retirement plans from the ex-
ception accorded to benefit and retirement plans under the Act. As a
result of the recent reorganization of federal equal employment oppor-
tunity enforcement and administration, the EEOC has issued proposed
interpretations that adopt with some modification the interpretations of
the DOL.
The question that persists throughout this development of federal
tion). The case was later remanded on the sex-discrimination issue since there had been no find-
ing of whether plaintiff had made out a prima facie case.
297. See Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972) and Johnson v. Georgia
Highway Express Inc., 4 Empl. Prac. Dec. 7753 (N.D. Ga. 1972) (both decided under Title VII).
298. See notes 170-88 supra and accompanying text.
299. 29 C.F.R. § 860.103(f)(2) (1979).
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anti-age discrimination law is whether any real protection against age
discrimination has been accorded to workers. The Act is by its very
nature limited in scope: only persons between 40 and 70 enjoy its pro-
tections, employers are permitted to take age into account where age is
a bona fide job requirement and employers need not provide older
workers the same benefits that are provided to younger workers. Ad-
ded to this is a judicial approach to the ADEA that is narrower in inter-
pretation than the judicial approach to Title VII. This narrower view
is, however, far from being judicial hostility to the Act. The difference
in judicial approaches can be explained on the basis of certain basic
differences between age discrimination and other forms of discrimina-
tion. For example, racial discrimination is a reflection of a hatred of a
particular race. Age discrimination, on the other hand, is more the re-
sult of misconceived notions about the employment abilities of older
workers.
This article has attempted to guide the courts and employers as
they chart compliance under the ADEA. As the case law begins to
develop in greater detail the substantive provisions of the Act, the diffi-
culty of charting such compliance should be reduced.
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